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MYTH OF THE COLOR-BLIND JUDGE:  
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RACIAL 
HARASSMENT CASES 
PAT K. CHEW  
ROBERT E. KELLEY∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, we present an exploratory empirical study of federal 
workplace racial harassment cases that span a twenty-year period. 
Multiple analyses found that judges’ race significantly affects outcomes in 
workplace racial harassment cases. African American judges rule 
differently than White judges, even when one takes into account their 
political affiliation or certain characteristics of the case. Our findings 
further suggest that judges of all races are attentive to the relevant facts of 
the cases but may reach different conclusions depending on their races. 
When race, political affiliation, and certain case characteristics are all 
considered simultaneously, the role that race plays loses some statistical 
significance (as one might expect given the increasing number of 
variables).  
While we cannot predict how an individual judge might act, our 
empirical analysis suggests that African American judges as a group and 
White judges as a group perceive racial harassment differently. These 
findings counter the traditional myth that the race of a judge would not 
make a difference—a myth premised on a presumption of a formalistic and 
objective decision-making process. 
Given the underrepresentation of minority judges, the growing 
minority population in the U.S., and minority skepticism of judicial 
fairness, this Article offers empirical support for a more racially diverse 
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judiciary. An increase in the number of judges of color promises to 
increase diverse perspectives in the judicial system and to help unveil the 
complex reality of racial dynamics in the workplace.  
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Our experiences instantly become part of the lens through which we 
view our entire past, present, and future, and like any lens, they 
shape and distort what we see.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s political climate, congressional and presidential partisanship 
have created a gauntlet for any judicial appointee and a quagmire of 
unfilled judicial posts.2 Legislators fight over the appropriate political, 
racial, and gender composition of the judiciary3 and debate the projected 
rulings of candidates of particular political bona fides.4 
While the judiciary has become more racially diverse, it remains 
homogeneously White and hardly reflects the diversity of the American 
society it serves.5 Understandably then, a range of politicians, scholars, 
and the judiciary itself continues to press for a more racially diverse and 
representative bench.6 
 
 
 1. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 49 (2007). 
 2. For discussions of the contentious political maneuvering in this process, see generally LEE 
EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
(2005); NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL 
COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2005); Lisa M. Holmes, Research Note, Why “Go Public”? 
Presidential Use of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 110 (2008); 
Tajuana D. Massie et al., The Timing of Presidential Nominations to the Lower Federal Courts, 57 
POL. RES. Q. 145 (2004). 
 3. For examples of disagreements over the gender and race of judicial nominees, see Theresa 
M. Beiner, How the Contentious Nature of Federal Judicial Appointments Affects “Diversity” on the 
Bench, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 849, 851–55 (2005) (suggesting more contentious nature of confirmation 
process for women and minority nominees for the federal judiciary, as indicated by lengthier time 
periods from their nomination to hearing to confirmation); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Representative 
Government, Representative Court? The Supreme Court as a Representative Body, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1252, 1252–58 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of 
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie 
L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of the Appointment Method in 
Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 504 (2002); Roger E. Hartley 
& Lisa M. Holmes, The Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 117 POL. SCI. 
Q. 259 (2002). 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.A–II.B. 
 6. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC 
DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, MILES TO GO: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 57 (2004); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, ANSWERING THE CALL 
FOR A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY: A REVIEW OF STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION MODELS AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON DIVERSITY 2–3 (2005) [hereinafter LAWYERS’ COMM.]; Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive 
(But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597 
(2003); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on 
State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A 
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What difference will it make if we have a more racially diverse 
judiciary? Some argue that greater diversity among judges would provide 
minority role models and that public confidence in the judiciary system 
would be enhanced.7 Others argue that having more judges of color may 
substantively improve the judicial decision-making process by increasing 
judicial impartiality and yielding fairer legal outcomes.8 
But do these benefits actually occur and are there accompanying costs? 
Researchers are just beginning to explore and answer these questions. In 
the past, so few minority judges sat on the bench that studying them would 
yield little generalizable information. While the numbers are still relatively 
small, there are enough judges that we can now begin to do preliminary 
analyses.9 In addition, while empirical research is still fairly novel in legal 
scholarship, it is emerging as an important and relevant form of analysis.10 
At the same time, scholars have begun to deploy innovative research 
methods for understanding the cognitive processes of judicial decision 
making, including the possible roles of race and prejudice in those 
processes.11 
 
 
Principled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5 
(2004); Patricia Yancey Martin et al., Gender Bias and Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and 
Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 SIGNS 665 (2002); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 
1252–58; Joy Milligan, Note, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions 
About Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206 (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public 
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 407 n.2 (2000) (citing others’ recognition of these 
benefits); LAWYERS’ COMM., supra note 6, at 2, 29.  
 An increased number of minority judges may also increase the pool of minority lawyers in the 
pipeline for the judiciary. As the number of minority judges increases, they would be a more visible 
presence in the judiciary. This increased visibility might inspire minority individuals to enter legal 
training and allow them to envision themselves as future judges. 
 8. See, e.g., CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 57; Ifill, supra note 7, at 411 (arguing “racial diversity 
on the bench also encourages judicial impartiality”); Milligan, supra note 6, at 1240–45 (discussing 
how racial diversity of judiciary increase judges’ openness to disparate answers); see also Beiner, 
supra note 6; Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 113 (1999).  
 9. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 10. See infra Part III.  
 11. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (describing how contemporary psychological research on the human mind 
and their own empirical research allowed them to posit a judicial “intuitive-override” model of 
decision making); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 
427, 431 (2007) (describing the “Implicit Association Test” which measures latency responses to 
different race-related stimuli). Nonetheless, very complex issues make the research process daunting, 
including determining the relevant factors when studying the role of judges’ race in their decision 
making. Possible considerations are the type of court, the type of case, the legal issues, characteristics 
of the parties, and the racial and gender composition of an appellate judicial panel. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/2
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This Article begins with a brief overview of the racial diversity of the 
judiciary of both the federal and state courts, including the degree to which 
they reflect the racial diversity of American society.12 Next follows an 
introduction to the social science research on judicial decision making.13 In 
particular, we discuss studies on how personal attributes of judges, such as 
race, relate to their judicial deliberations.14 
We then turn to our own empirical study of judges’ race and their 
decision making in federal court cases on workplace racial harassment.15 
While we focus on the judges’ race,16 we also consider how the judges’ 
political affiliation17 and how the plaintiff-employees’ particular claims of 
racial harassment affect who wins.18 Racial harassment cases are a 
particularly appropriate context for these inquiries because the relevant 
laws require judges to tap their discretionary judgment on race-related 
matters.19 In addition, the thousands of racial harassment claims20 make 
understanding judicial decision making in these cases urgent.  
Our exploratory empirical study, the first on the role of judges’ race in 
racial harassment cases, resulted in striking findings.21 We learned that 
judges’ race matters very much in how cases turn out, but not necessarily 
in predictable ways. For example, African American judges rule quite 
differently from White judges. The judges’ political affiliation and the 
merits of the case also can play a part. The study’s results bring both 
comfort and consternation to those who think that judicial decision making 
is a totally rational and objective process. 
 
 
 12. See discussion infra Part II. 
 13. See discussion infra Part III. 
 14. See discussion infra Part III. 
 15. See discussion infra Parts IV–VI. 
 16. See discussion infra Parts IV.B–V.A. 
 17. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, V.B. 
 18. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, V.C. 
 19. See infra notes 104–16 and accompanying text. 
 20. Over 7000 racial harassment complaints were filed in 2007. Telephone Interview with 
Stephanie Aiken Murphy, Program Analyst, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n (Mar. 7, 
2008). For general statistics on all race-based complaints and all harassment-related complaints, see 
EEOC, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2009). 
 21. See discussion infra Parts IV.B–VI. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. COLOR OF THE JUDICIARY 
A. Racial Representation in the Judiciary 
Data on the racial diversity of the judiciary are now available from 
various sources.22 These data reveal that, although a minority judge is not 
the rare phenomenon it was decades ago,23 the American judiciary 
continues to be overrepresented by Whites. As we discuss below, this 
overrepresentation persists in both the federal and state courts. 
In the federal courts, out of a total of 805 active judges, non-White 
judges constitute about 19% of the bench.24 As shown in Chart 1, 11% of 
judges are African Americans, 7% are Hispanic,25 and fewer than 1% are 
Asian Americans. Minority representation is lower at the federal appellate 
level than at the district court level.26 Currently, no Native American 
judges sit on the federal judiciary at all,27 and no Asian Americans sit at 
the appellate level.28 As Lawrence Baca, a Native American and former 
 
 
 22. CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 56 (discussing increase in sources). Data on the federal 
judiciary are accessible through the Federal Judicial Center. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the 
United States Courts, Biographical Directory of Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Directory of Federal Judges]. Its website provides biographical data 
about the federal judiciary, including, for example, judges’ race, gender, and party of the nominating 
president. Id. 
 The Directory of Federal Judges indicates that judges’ races, whenever possible, are based on self-
definition. Id. (follow the About the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges link). See also 
CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 53–57. Data on the racial diversity of state judges are also online. 
American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, National Database on 
Judicial Diversity in State Courts, http://www.abanet.org/judind/diversity/national.html (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2008) [hereinafter State Courts]. See also LAWYERS’ COMM., supra note 6, at 9.  
 23. Two decades ago, there were only four African American federal judges, compared to eighty 
White judges and eighty-nine total judges. Thus, African Americans represented 4.5% of the federal 
bench at that time. These data were found by searching for active sitting African American judges, 
White judges, and all judges commissioned before January 1, 1989 on the Directory of Federal Judges. 
Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 22 (search last ran Mar. 10, 2009).  
 24. See Table A, infra note 31; Chart 1 (combining the percentages of the minority judges). 
 25. While we could have used the also prevalent term Latinos/Latinas, we chose Hispanic not as 
a political statement, but because the U.S. Census Bureau and the Federal Judicial Centers are key 
sources of data used in this Article, and they used the term Hispanic. ELIZABETH M. GRIECO & 
RACHEL C. CASSIDY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU OVERVIEW OF RACE & HISPANIC ORIGIN: CENSUS 2000 
BRIEF (2001); Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 22 (Hispanic category indicated when searching 
for race of judges). The U.S. Census Bureau uses the term “Hispanic” to describe individuals who self-
identified as “Spanish/Hispanic/Latino” including those who further marked themselves as Mexican, 
Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, or Cuban. GRIECO & CASSIDY, supra, at 1.  
 26. Sixteen percent of the courts of appeals is minority, and 20% of the district courts is 
minority. See Table A, infra note 31 (calculating percentages from numbers given there). 
 27. See Table A, infra note 31. Two Native Americans had been appointed to the federal 
judiciary in the past, but none currently sit on the bench. Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 22 
(identifying Billy Michael Burrage and Frank Howell Seay as the only two Native American jurists).  
 28. See Table A, infra note 31. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/2
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chair of the ABA Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the 
Profession, reports, he has been before a minority judge only once in his 
twenty-seven-year career at the Department of Justice.29 Baca observed 
that he would likely retire from practice “‘without ever once appearing 
before a judge of my own race.’”30 
CHART 1: FEDERAL JUDGES BY RACE31 
 
In the state courts, minority representation is even less than in the 
federal courts. Minority judges represent approximately 10% of the bench 
at all state court levels,32 as shown in Chart 2. African Americans 
 
 
 29. CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 57. 
 30. Id. (quoting Lawrence Baca, Observations on the Importance of Diversity in the Law Office: 
One Indian’s Perspective 8 (unpublished essay on file with Elizabeth Chambliss)). 
 31. The percentages in Chart 1 are based on the numbers shown below in Table A, which the 
authors compiled from data in the Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 22, by searching for judges 
by race and court level. 
TABLE A: FEDERAL JUDGES 
Federal Judges by Race (Numbers) 
Court White African American Hispanic Asian American Native American Total
Supreme Court 8  1 0 0 0 9
Courts of Appeals 137 14 12 0 0 163
District Courts 507 74 46 6 0 633
Total 652 89 58 6 0 805
 
 32. This percentage is calculated from data provided in Table B, infra note 34. Minority 
representation is 9.8% at the trial court, 10.4% at the intermediate appellate court, 9.7% at the state 
supreme court, and 9.9% in the aggregate. 
White 
81% 
African 
American  
11% 
Hispanic
7.2%
Asian 
American
0.7%
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constitute fewer than 6%, Hispanics fewer than 3%, Asian Americans 
1.1%, and Native Americans 0.1%. Minority judges predominantly serve 
in the state trial courts rather than state appellate courts.33 
CHART 2: STATE JUDGES BY RACE34 
 
 
 
 33. See Table B, infra note 34. 
 34.  The percentages in Chart 2 are based on the numbers shown below in Table B, which the 
authors compiled from data from State Courts, supra note 22.  
TABLE B: STATE JUDGES 
Court State Judges by Race (Numbers) 
 
White 
African 
American Hispanic
Asian 
American
Native 
American Other Total 
State Supreme Courts 307 20 8 5 0 0 340
Intermediate Appellate Courts 856 60 25 13 2 2 958
Trial Courts 9037 585 287 104 11 22 10,046
Total 10,200 665 320 122 13 24 11,344
 
White
89.9%
Hispanic
2.8% 
Other
0.2%
Asian 
American
1.1% Native 
American
0.1% 
African 
American
5.9% 
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CHART 3: ALL JUDGES BY RACE35 
 
As shown in Chart 3, combining both federal and state courts, the 
percentages of judges by race are similar to those in the state courts. Of a 
total of over 12,000 judges, White judges constitute approximately 90% 
and minority judges constitute approximately 10%.36 African American 
 
 
 35. The percentages for Chart 3 are based on Table C below, which the authors compiled from 
the data given in Table A, supra note 31, and Table B, supra note 34.  
TABLE C: ALL JUDGES 
All Judges by Race (Numbers) 
 State Judges Federal Judges Total 
White 10,200 652 10,852 
African American 665 89 754 
Hispanic 320 58 378 
Asian American 122 6 128 
Native American 13 0 13 
Other 24 0 24 
Total 11,344 805 12,149 
 
 36. These percentages are based on the percentages in Chart 3. Minority judges consist of African 
American, Hispanic, Asian American, and Native American judges.  
White
89.3%
Other
0.2%
Hispanic
3.1% 
Asian 
American
1.1% 
African 
American
6.2% 
Native 
American
0.1% 
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and Hispanic judges together constitute about 90% of all the minority 
judges.37  
B. Judicial Diversity in Context 
1. Racial Underrepresentation Relative to the General Population 
The practical significance of this paucity of minority judges comes into 
focus when one compares their representation to that of the general 
population. In theory, if the judiciary is open to all individuals regardless 
of race, one would expect minority representation in the judiciary to reflect 
minority representation in the general population. Instead, as described 
below, a dramatic discrepancy exists between minority representation on 
the bench and in American society generally. 
TABLE 1: MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN GENERAL POPULATION38 
African Americans 
Hispanics 
Asian Americans  
Native Americans39 
12.3% 
12.5% 
3.6% 
1.0% 
 
Comparing Table 1 and Chart 3, while minorities constitute about 30% 
of the general population, only about 10% of the judiciary is of color.40 
More specifically, over 12% of the general population is African 
American, while African American judges represent about 6% of the 
overall judiciary. Among Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Native 
Americans, the disparity is even greater. Hispanics represent about 12.5% 
in the general population, about four times their representation on the 
judiciary. Similarly, Asian Americans constitute 3.6% of the general 
population, over three times their representation on the bench. Meanwhile, 
Native Americans are underrepresented by a factor of ten. Moreover, this 
summary likely underestimates the underrepresentation of minority 
judges, given that the most current census data for the general population 
 
 
 37. This percentage is calculated from data in Chart 3 and Table C, supra note 35.  
 38. Table 1 is compiled from data taken from GRIECO & CASSIDY, supra note 25, at 3.  
 39. This percentage includes both (1) American Indians and Alaska Natives, and (2) Native 
Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders. Id.  
 40. Adding all the percentages in Table 1 equals 29.4%. Adding the percentages in Chart 3 for 
African American, Hispanic, Asian American, and Native American judges equals 10.5%.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/2
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are from 2000 and minority populations have markedly increased in the 
last eight years.41  
Disaggregating the data on state and federal judges provides additional 
insights into racial diversity in the two systems. By comparing the data in 
Table 1 and Chart 2, we see that state court judges reflect extreme 
underrepresentation among every racial minority group. In contrast, by 
comparing the data in Table 1 and Chart 1, we find that while federal court 
judges also underrepresent minorities as a whole, the level of 
underrepresentation varies with each racial group. Hispanics number 
almost twice the representation in the general population as in the federal 
judiciary.42 Asian Americans have over five times the representation in the 
general population than in the federal judiciary,43 indicating the greatest 
underrepresentation among minority groups except for Native Americans. 
As indicated earlier, Native Americans are not represented at all on the 
federal bench.44 On the other hand, the representation of African 
Americans in the federal judiciary suggests a positive direction, with 
12.3% representation in the general population and 11.1% representation 
in the federal judiciary.  
2. Racial Diversity in the Bar and Among Presidential Appointments 
The racial diversity of lawyers is also relevant to our understanding of 
the diversity of judges. Judges are typically selected from among lawyers, 
so a lack of minority lawyers would make it more challenging to build a 
racially diverse judiciary and might explain in part the scarcity of minority 
judges. In fact, minorities are dramatically underrepresented among 
lawyers.45 In 2000, about 4% of lawyers were African American, 3.3% 
were Hispanic, 2.3% were Asian American, and 0.2% were Native 
American.46 Combined, minority lawyers constituted less than 10% of the 
 
 
 41. TIME Magazine, for instance, reported in 2006 that Hispanics represented 14.8% and Asian 
Americans 4.4% of the population. Kathleen Adams et al., America By the Numbers, TIME, Oct. 30, 
2006, at 44. 
 42. Hispanics represent 12.5% of the general population and 7.2% of the federal bench. See 
supra Chart 1; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 43. Asian Americans represent 3.6% of the general populations and 0.7% of the federal bench. 
See supra Chart 1; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 44. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 45. See CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 5. 
 46. Id. Chambliss also indicates that minority representation among lawyers is less than in some 
other professions including physicians and surgeons, computer scientists, and accountants. Id. at 6–7. 
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bar even though minorities constituted nearly 30% of the general 
population.47 
The small number of minority lawyers relative to the general 
population, however, is not a complete explanation for the lack of minority 
judges. Although having more minority lawyers has many benefits, 
including providing a bigger pool of talented judicial candidates, a lack of 
minority lawyers does not appear to be the real constraint on the 
appointment of more minority judges. Indeed, there are many minorities in 
the legal profession who would appear to have the prima facie 
qualifications to be judges. For example, between 2002 and 2003, there 
was a substantial pool of successful minority legal professionals to 
consider: 65 minority Congressional representatives, over 500 minority 
full professors in law schools, and over 18,000 minority partners in the 
country’s largest law firms.48 As further evidence that there already is a 
pool of qualified minority candidates, consider the fact that some 
Presidents were able to identify and appoint minority judicial nominees. 
As shown in Table 2, over 20% of the judicial appointments by Presidents 
Carter and Clinton were minorities.  
TABLE 2: PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS BY JUDGES’ RACE/ETHNICITY49 
 
Total 
African 
American 
(%) 
Hispanic 
(%) 
Asian 
American 
(%) 
Native 
American 
(%) 
Total 
Minority 
(%) 
Nixon (1969–74) 227 6 (2.6) 2 (0.9) 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 10 (4.4)
Ford (1974–76) 65 3 (4.6) 1 (1.5) 2 (3.1) 0 (0.0) 6 (9.2)
Carter (1977–80) 258 37 (14.3) 16 (6.2) 2 (0.8) 1 (0.4) 56 (21.7)
Reagan (1981–88) 378 7 (1.9) 13 (3.4) 2 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 22 (5.8)
Bush (1989–92) 192 11 (5.7) 8 (4.2) 1 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 20 (10.4)
Clinton (1993–2000) 378 62 (16.4) 24 (6.3) 5 (1.3) 1 (0.3) 92 (24.3)
Bush (2001–07) 276 20 (7.2) 27 (9.8) 2 (0.9) 0 (0.0) 49 (17.6)
 
The data in Table 2 also indicate that Presidents vary in the percentage 
of their judicial appointments that are minority. In contrast to Presidents 
Carter and Clinton, Presidents Reagan (5.8%) and George H. Bush 
(10.4%) appointed a much lower percentage of minority judges. The 
 
 
 47.  Id. at 5, 63–64 (combining percentages of minority lawyers and discussing representation of 
each racial group); supra Table 1 (providing minority representation in the general population).  
 48. CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 51, 58, 30.  
 49. Table 2 was compiled from CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 55 (data for Presidents Nixon 
through Clinton), and the Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 22 (obtained on Feb. 27, 2008) (data 
for President George W. Bush).  
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second President Bush’s appointment of minority judges (17.6%) was 
closer to the percentage of minority judges appointed by Presidents Carter 
and Clinton. In the aggregate, Democratic administrations contributed 
more to the racial diversity of the judiciary than Republican 
administrations between 1969 and 2007. Minority judges constituted 
approximately 23% of all judicial appointments by Democratic presidents 
in contrast to 9.5% of all judicial appointments by Republican presidents 
during that period.50 
III. RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AND JUDGES’ RACE 
While the empirical study of judicial decision making by legal scholars 
is fairly recent, researchers in other disciplines have produced a significant 
body of literature on this topic. Political scientists, in particular, have 
considered how certain characteristics of judges, such as their political 
affiliation, are indicators of their ideological attitudes and voting 
patterns.51 Given their training, they are especially astute at observing 
judicial decision making in the political environment in which courts 
operate. For instance, numerous studies analyze the political affiliation of 
Supreme Court justices and its relationship to their voting patterns in 
different types of cases.52 
Although new to this research area, legal scholars are uniquely 
positioned to contribute. Given their legal training, they are careful 
observers of the nuances of judicial decision making and are in a unique 
position to apply empirical analysis to legal issues.53 Moreover, traditional 
legal scholarship tends to have little or no empirical content, so by 
comparison, the emerging empirical research by legal scholars is 
 
 
 50. The percentages were calculated by taking the total number of judges appointed during this 
period, as shown in Table 2, and determining what percent were appointed by Republican Presidents 
and by Democratic Presidents. 
 51. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, 
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and 
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995); C. Neal Tate, Personal 
Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties 
and Economics Decisions, 1946–1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1981). 
 52. See supra note 51.  
 53. In employment discrimination cases, for instance, courts have recognized the value of more 
sophisticated statistical methods, such as regression analysis. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 
385, 400 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). Other key judicial opinions on employment discrimination 
laws value as evidence the results of more basic statistical methods, such as calculating frequencies, 
percentages, and cross-tabulations. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
342 n.23 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306–13 (1977). 
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developing the particular blend of social science and legal research that is 
most appropriate to legal issues.  
While both social scientists and legal scholars doing empirical research 
in this area may not state their beliefs directly, they implicitly make certain 
assumptions about the way judges reach decisions and how the law 
operates.54 In particular, they adhere to a more realist model of judicial 
decision making, which argues that judges, like other people, are affected 
in their decision making by social forces and their own experiences and 
values.55 Thus, judges’ characteristics, such as their race, gender, and 
political affiliation, would be meaningful because they help us better 
understand how judges interpret the facts, apply often unclear legal 
principles, and reach legal conclusions. 
This model of judicial decision making is an uncomfortable one for 
legal scholars who adhere to a more formalist model of judges.56 
Formalists tend to view judges as arbiters of justice who assess the facts 
and interpret the law in a rational and more mechanical way consistent 
with well-established legal principles.57 Thus, judges are not likely 
 
 
 54. A fundamental assumption is that an array of judicial characteristics is identifiable and 
measurable. Some characteristics, such as judges’ race, age, sex, education, and work experiences are 
objectively determinable and typically self-reported. However, we recognize that some of these 
characteristics, such as race, are socially constructed, and that an ongoing debate about the usefulness 
and appropriateness of these commonly used categories continues. See, e.g., PETER SKERRY, 
COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?: RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS 51–59 (2000); 
Charles Hirschman et al., The Meaning and Measurement of Race in the U.S. Census: Glimpses into 
the Future, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 381, 381, 390 (2000). Other characteristics, however, are not typically 
self-reported, so they need to be measured in some other way. For example, since the political party of 
judges is not readily ascertainable, researchers use the political party of the nominating President as a 
reasonable proxy for the political affiliation of the judge. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics 
and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 
(1995); Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges’ Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981–1996 (June 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Chicago) (on file with authors). The reasoning is that a judge nominated by a Republican President is 
likely, even if not a member of the Republican Party, to share political ideology similar to 
Republicans.  
 55.  There are parallels in social psychology to this model of judicial decision making. For 
instance, social psychologists explain human behavior and decision making in part by a consideration 
of social forces and life experiences. See, e.g., HENRY GLEITMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY 379–99 (6th 
ed. 2004) (describing social impact theory). In addition, there are also parallels to the realist model of 
judicial decision making, as described by legal scholars. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM 
AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); Guthrie et al., supra note 11, at 2–3; Burt Neurorne, Essay, Of Sausage 
Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 420 (1992); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1138, 1145–48 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)). 
 56. For discussions on the formalist model of judicial decision making, see, for example, Guthrie 
et al., supra note 11, at 2–3; Leiter, supra note 55, at 1145–48; Neurorne, supra note 55, at 420.  
 57. See Leiter, supra note 55, at 1144–45. 
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influenced by personal attitudes and values because their role does not 
allow much discretion.  
Increasingly, however, more legal scholars are acknowledging that 
judges have human inclinations and that judges’ ability to be purely 
objective about the case may be largely theoretical.58 Many sensitive 
questions remain, however, on what those human inclinations are, when 
they come into play, and how they affect judicial decision making. 
A wide range of studies considers how the personal attributes and 
backgrounds of judges influences how they rule.59 Some study federal 
courts while others consider state courts.60 The subject of cases varies, 
ranging from criminal law cases to employment law.61 Until fairly 
recently, research did not include the judges’ genders or races. However, 
with a more diverse judiciary, researchers are beginning to focus on these 
 
 
 58. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 11, at 19–28; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive 
Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment 
Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835 (2004); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and 
Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1278–79 (2005); Richard A. 
Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 1–7 (1993).  
 59. See, e.g., CASSIA L. SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? 101–17 (2002); Ashenfelter et al., 
supra note 4; Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 
JUDICATURE 129 (1993); John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 308 (1981); Josh Hsu, Asian American Judges: Identity, Their Narratives, & Diversity 
on the Bench, 11 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 92 (2006); Carol T. Kulik et al., Here Comes the Judge: 
The Influence of Judge Personal Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment Case Outcomes, 27 
HUM. BEHAV. 69 (2003); Kenneth L. Manning et al., Does Age Matter? Judicial Decision Making in 
Age Discrimination Cases, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 1 (2004); Patricia Yancey Martin et al., Gender Bias and 
Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 SIGNS 665 
(2002); Daniel M. Schneider, Statutory Construction in Federal Appellate Tax Cases: The Effects of 
Judges’ Social Backgrounds and of Other Aspects of Litigation, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 257 (2003); Donald 
R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts 
of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425 (1994); Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L Britt, Judges’ Race and Judicial 
Decision Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 749 (2001); Darrell 
Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge’s Gender Affect the 
Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163 (1998); Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite 
Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884 (1978); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, 
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisonmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 
YALE L.J. 1759 (2005); Crowe, supra note 54; Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Taking Sides: The Impact 
of Judicial Gender on Decisions in Divorce Law (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Washington University Law Review); Tajuana Massie et al., The Impact of Gender and Race in the 
Decisions of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Washington University Law Review).  
 60. E.g., Ifill, supra note 6 (state trial courts); Kulik et al., supra note 59 (federal cases); 
Manning et al., supra note 59 (federal district courts); Martin & Pyle, supra note 59 (state courts); 
Massie et al., supra note 59 (federal courts of appeal). 
 61. E.g., SPOHN, supra note 59 (criminal sentencing decisions); Kulik et al., supra note 59 
(sexual harassment law); Manning et al., supra note 59 (criminal law); Massie et al., supra note 59 
(criminal procedure, civil rights cases); Schneider, supra note 59 (federal tax law). 
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traits, sometimes in combination with other attributes such as the judges’ 
ages or political affiliations.62 The results of this empirical research are not 
consistent. Some studies find little relationship between the judges’ 
attributes and their decision making, while others find significant 
patterns.63 This area of research is clearly in the early stages.64 
Nonetheless, research on judges’ race is emerging, as the small but 
notable increase in minority judges has made empirical research more 
meaningful. For example, researchers are wondering if disturbing legal 
trends related to race and sentencing might be linked to the judge’s own 
race.65 Could the disparities in the sentencing of criminal defendants from 
different racial groups, for instance, be linked to the race of the presiding 
judges, or do alternative explanations account for the disparities?66 
The works of Cassia Spohn,67 Nancy Crowe,68 Adam Cox and Thomas 
Miles69 illustrate the emerging research on the role of the judge’s race in 
judicial decision making. Prompted in part by the racial disparities in the 
sentencing of criminal defendants, Spohn reviewed others’ research and 
conducted her own studies on judicial decision making in this setting.70 In 
a survey of research on the judges’ race, she found contradictory results.71 
Some studies noted differences in the sentencing behavior of African 
American and White judges, while others found little or none.72 She found 
 
 
 62. E.g., SPOHN, supra note 59 (race and gender); Gruhl et al., supra note 59 (gender); Hsu, 
supra note 59 (race); Kulik, supra note 59 (gender, race, age, and political affiliation); Martin et al., 
supra note 59 (gender); Songer et al., supra note 59 (gender); Peresie, supra note 59 (gender); Martin 
& Pyle, supra note 59 (gender); Massie et al., supra note 59 (gender and race); Crowe, supra note 54 
(gender and race). 
 Interestingly, research on the relationship of judges’ gender to their decision making is already 
more prevalent and more varied than on judges’ race. Perhaps this is because female judges outnumber 
minority judges, thus providing a larger base to study. Or, perhaps more researchers are interested in 
gender issues than race issues, despite the critical importance of both topics. See Pat K. Chew, Freeing 
Racial Harassment from the Sexual Harassment Model, 85 OR. L. REV. 615, 618 (2006) (noting the 
relative lack of research on racial harassment law, in comparison to research on sexual harassment 
law). 
 63. To illustrate, consider Spohn’s discussion of research on the race of judges and its 
relationship to criminal sentencing. See infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.  
 64. Given that this field is still in its development stage, scholars are debating the appropriate 
research methodology. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Age (Really) Matter? A 
Response to Manning, Carroll, and Carp, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 19 (2004); Manning et al., supra note 59. 
 65. SPOHN, supra note 59, at 179–208.  
 66. Id. at 165–218.  
 67. SPOHN, supra note 59. 
 68. Crowe, supra note 54. 
 69. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2008).  
 70. SPOHN, supra note 59, at 165–218.  
 71. Id. at 106–10. 
 72. Id.  
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in her own study of sentencing of violent felons in Detroit that judges as a 
group did discriminate and impose harsher sentences on African American 
than on White offenders.73 Contrary to her expectations, however, both 
African American and White judges imposed these harsher sentences.74 
She speculated that both African American and White judges might think 
of African American offenders as more threatening and dangerous than 
their White counterparts.75 In addition, at least some of the discriminatory 
treatment of African American offenders by African American judges 
might be attributable to their sympathy toward and identification with 
African American victims.76 In other words, African American judges may 
see themselves more as potential victims of black-on-black crime and do 
not particularly empathize with African American criminals. In this 
connection, Spohn noted a study of sentencing by White and Hispanic 
judges in El Paso, Texas.77 That study found that Hispanic judges imposed 
similar sentences on Hispanic and White offenders but that White judges 
gave more lenient sentences to White offenders.78 Hispanic judges, like 
their African American counterparts, might view themselves as victims of 
crimes by both Hispanic and Whites perpetrators, while White judges 
might see Hispanic criminals as a greater threat than White ones. 
Nancy Crowe studied the effects of judges’ sex and race on judicial 
decision making in sex and race discrimination cases.79 After looking at 
twelve federal courts of appeal over a fifteen year period, she found that 
the sex of judges makes a difference in sex discrimination cases but not in 
race discrimination cases.80 In particular, female judges were more likely 
than male judges to vote in favor of the plaintiffs, who are most typically 
women,81 in sex discrimination cases.82 In contrast, female judges did not 
 
 
 73. Id. at 108–10. 
 74. Id. at 109. 
 75. Id. at 110. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. As the authors of that study hypothesized: “‘Anglo judges are not so much discriminating 
against Hispanic defendants as they are favoring members of their ethnic group.’” Id. (quoting M.D. 
Holmes et al., Judges’ Ethnicity and Minority Sentencing: Evidence Concerning Hispanics, 74 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 496, 502 (1993)). 
 79. Crowe, supra note 54.  
 80. Id. at 80–81, 110–11. Crowe also found that judges’ political partisanship played a role. 
Judges appointed by a Democratic President (both African American and White Democratic judges) 
were much more likely than those appointed by a Republican President to vote for plaintiffs in both 
sex discrimination and race discrimination cases. Id. at 80, 111. 
 81. See Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 548, 595 (2001). 
 82. Crowe, supra note 54, at 80. 
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vote differently than male judges in race discrimination cases.83 Crowe 
posited that the gender of the judge may “only matter in areas of law 
which deal explicitly with gender,” and that “female judges [may] not 
generalize [their identification with] sex discrimination plaintiffs to other 
types of discrimination plaintiffs.”84 She found, however, that the race of 
judges does make a difference in both sex and race discrimination cases.85 
Significant differences appeared in voting patterns: African American 
judges held for plaintiffs nearly twice as often in sex discrimination cases 
and over twice as often in race discrimination cases, as compared to White 
judges.86 As Crowe suggests, the race of the judge may be relevant in 
cases that deal with race discrimination but also in cases that deal with 
discrimination more broadly.87 Perhaps African American judges are 
empathic to discriminatory experiences of all kinds.88  
Finally, Adam Cox and Thomas Miles studied all published federal 
cases since 1982 that were decided under Section Two of the Voting 
Rights Act.89 The Voting Rights Act was enacted principally in response 
to disenfranchisement of African Americans in the South,90 and so, not 
surprisingly, plaintiffs are often African Americans.91 After controlling for 
other factors, including the political party of the judges, Cox and Miles 
found that the race of judges makes a difference in case outcomes.92 
African American judges are more than twice as likely as non–African 
American judges (mostly White) to vote for Section Two liability.93 
Moreover, they investigated whether the presence of an African American 
judge on a judicial panel affects the votes of his or her colleagues.94 They 
found that it made a significant difference, with White judges more likely 
 
 
 83. Id. at 111.  
 84. Id. at 115.  
 85. Id. at 80–91, 110–11.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 134.  
 88. Id. at 116 (positing as a potential explanation that “African Americans, having been exposed 
to more and perhaps different kinds of discrimination, are primed to see discrimination in ways and in 
places that women are not.”). 
 89. Cox & Miles, supra note 69, at 3.  
 90. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (discussing how the enacting 
“Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in 
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”). 
 91. Cox & Miles, supra note 69, at 54. 
 92. Id. at 45, 48–49. 
 93. Id. at 30. African American judges voted in favor of liability 56% of the time in contrast to 
the non–African American judges voting to impose liability only 26% of the time. Id. The authors note 
that, given the relatively small number of votes by African American judges, this finding should be 
interpreted cautiously. Id. at 30–31. 
 94. Id. at 34–37. 
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to vote in favor of liability when they sit with an African American 
colleague.95 The researchers theorized that White judges’ view of the 
merits of the case may change when they deliberate with African 
American colleagues who share their different experiences and 
information relating to discriminatory practices.96 
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY: JUDGES’ RACE IN RACIAL HARASSMENT CASES 
Noting the absence of research on the subject, we conducted the first 
study of the relationship between judges’ race and the outcomes in racial 
harassment in the workplace cases. This study builds on an earlier 
empirical examination of the characteristics and patterns in racial 
harassment cases that analyzed judicial opinions from a twenty-one year 
time period—essentially the entire history of racial harassment case law 
under federal laws up to 2002.97 This earlier study found that employees 
infrequently succeed in their racial harassment claims brought under 
federal law: plaintiffs succeeded only 21.5% of the time.98 Examining the 
cases in more detail, this earlier study observed that plaintiffs in racial 
harassment cases are overwhelmingly minorities, and most typically 
African American, whose harassers tend to be White.99 
This current study further probes racial harassment cases by 
considering whether the race of the judge is related to how these 
proceedings end. The judges in the racial harassment cases in our study, 
consistent with the racial profile of the federal judiciary generally,100 are 
 
 
 95. Id. at 34–35. 
 96. Id. at 35–36.  
 97. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 53–54 (2006). 
 98. Id. at 54. The plaintiffs’ success rates in studies of employment discrimination cases vary. 
Compare Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 889, 916 (2006) (finding 27% overall plaintiff win rate in race and national origin discrimination 
cases), with Crowe, supra note 54, at 80, 110 (finding 48% plaintiff win rate in sex discrimination and 
45% in race discrimination cases), and Juliano & Schwab, supra note 81, at 594 (finding 48.2% 
overall plaintiff win rate in sexual harassment cases, with 51.2% of the district court cases and 39% of 
the appellate court cases). These variations may occur for a number of reasons, including: the level of 
court (appellate versus district courts); the subject (e.g., all employment discrimination cases, sex 
discrimination, race discrimination, sexual harassment, or racial harassment); the publication source 
(official reporter system or all on-line cases); the time period studied; and the research methodology. 
Our earlier study and the study described in this Article included district court cases and appellate 
court cases, cases published in the official reporter system and those available only online, and cases 
over a twenty-year time period. Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 76, 78, 98. We included all these 
cases to obtain as representative a data set of racial harassment case law as possible. 
 99. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 96–109. 
 100. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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overwhelmingly White. In a typical racial harassment case, therefore, a 
White judge hears an African American employee’s complaint that White 
supervisors or coworkers harassed her or him because of race. This 
difference in the races of plaintiffs and judges is most meaningful, of 
course, if the race of the judge makes a significant difference in her or his 
decision making. As we subsequently demonstrate, our research indicates 
that it does.101 Moreover, judges’ race is meaningful even when we take 
into account judges’ political affiliation.102 For example, African 
American Democratic judges rule differently than White Democratic 
judges.103  
Racial harassment law is a particularly appropriate focus for this type 
of research. This area of law allows judges considerable latitude. While 
the fundamental legal principles for racial harassment cases are well 
known,104 they continue to evolve and are subject to varied and subjective 
interpretations that may well yield different legal conclusions.105  
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,106 the Supreme Court recognized 
that a discriminatory harassment claim, also called hostile environment 
claim, is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: “Title 
VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.”107 Unlike other race 
discrimination cases where a particular employment practice or decision 
(e.g., decision to hire, fire, or promote) is the focus of the discrimination 
claim,108 racial harassment cases more typically involve supervisors’ and 
coworkers’ day-to-day, often informal, use of abusive language and 
behavior toward an employee because of her or his race.109 In a line of 
 
 
 101. See discussion infra Parts IV.B–V.  
 102. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 103. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 104. Supreme Court cases have stated the key legal principles for the harassment doctrine. See 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–92 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742, 751–54 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–82 (1998); 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 66–69 (1986). These cases and their contributions to harassment jurisprudence are described 
further in THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO 
REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 15–20, 97–114 (2005).  
 105. Our earlier study of racial harassment cases, for instance, demonstrates that there is great 
variability in how judges interpret the applicable legal principles. Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 
81–82.  
 106. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. 57. 
 107. Id. at 65.  
 108. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
 109. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65–67. As the Faragher case makes clear, however, a 
“tangible employment action” can be an example of a supervisor’s conduct, along with other harassing 
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cases, the Supreme Court set forth the claim’s key elements.110 First, the 
harassment must be sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to alter the victim’s 
work conditions and result in a “hostile . . . environment.”111 This severe 
or pervasive standard must be met objectively (i.e., a reasonableness 
standard) as well as subjectively by the plaintiff.112 Second, the harassment 
must be because of race rather than being motivated by a reason unrelated 
to race (such as an employee’s incompetence or the boss’s generally nasty 
personality).113 Although terms such as “severe or pervasive,” “hostile 
environment,” and “because of race” are subject to myriad interpretations, 
the Court has failed to provide clear guidance on their meanings.114  
Racial harassment law further enables one to study a rich and 
representative sample of cases from a range of federal circuits and states 
that span a significant time period.115 Since reported judicial opinions on 
racial harassment cases arise most typically on defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment,116 these cases allow us to focus squarely on judges’ 
rather than juries’ decision making. Finally, this area of law presents the 
opportunity to study judicial decision making in cases where the racial 
paradigm is of judges who are typically White, plaintiffs who are typically 
minority, and legal issues that demand race-based factual analysis.  
 
 
conduct, that serves as the factual foundation for a harassment claim. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 110. See supra note 104. While all these Supreme Court cases involve sexual harassment fact 
patterns, the Court has assumed that the principles laid out in sexual harassment cases and racial 
harassment cases are interchangeable. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65–66; Chew, supra 
note 62, at 618–19. 
 111. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.  
 112. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.  
 113. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 
75 (1998) (exploring this attributional requirement in the context of sexual harassment). 
 114. In Harris, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the majority opinion’s explanation of the legal 
standards for a hostile environment claim were not very clear and left “virtually unguided” jurists and 
juries to decide these cases. Harris, 510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 115. See, e.g., Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 96–97, 75–77.  
 116. Id. at 78 tbl.10; Krieger, supra note 58, at 839 (noting few civil cases go to trial; rather, most 
are disposed of through pretrial motions, most commonly motions for summary judgment). “To 
survive a defense motion for summary judgment” and proceed to trial, the “plaintiff must convince the 
judge that . . . a reasonable jury, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility 
conflicts against the employer, could render a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 840. If the plaintiff 
provides evidence “sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact” on any element, the judge is 
supposed to deny the defendant’s motion. Id. As Krieger explains, in deciding summary motions, 
judges use their intuition “to determine what inferences can ‘reasonably’ be drawn from any particular 
set of facts.” Id.  
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A. Research Methodology 
We designed a research process to identify representative cases and 
judges so that any inferences we drew from the data would be as 
generalizable as possible. We randomly selected forty percent of all 
reported racial harassment cases from six federal circuits between 1981 
and 2003.117 From these judicial opinions, we collected information on 
each case (including characteristics of the parties, the nature of the alleged 
harassment, and the outcome of the proceeding). We also collected 
detailed biographical information on the presiding judge in each case 
(including her or his race, gender, and political affiliation).118 A single 
judge presided in district court cases, and a panel of three judges typically 
sat in appellate court cases. Our study included a total of 256 different 
judges, some of whom heard more than one case. Pairing each case with 
each judge hearing the case yielded a total sample of 428 judge/case 
pairs.119 As indicated in Appendix A, for some variables we had data on 
every case and every judge in the study, while in others the data were less 
complete. We performed a number of descriptive and statistical analyses 
 
 
 117. We randomly sampled judicial opinions from West and LEXIS, including opinions 
designated for the Federal Reporter system and opinions not so designated, from the First, Second, 
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh federal circuits. These circuits represent different geographical 
regions and include large states with racially diverse populations. Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 53 
& n.8. Building on the data set from our prior study, we added judges’ biographical data and updated 
the cases an additional year, so that the data set for this study included cases between 1981 and 2003. 
However, judicial opinions in West and LEXIS are not all judicial opinions since federal judges do not 
release all their opinions to legal publishers, and these publishers do not necessarily publish all the 
opinions they receive from the judges. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 62 & n.58.  
 118. See infra Appendix A (listing the collected information).  
 119. If the same judge presided over more than one of the cases, she or he was included for each 
case. Therefore, it was possible for a particular judge in one case opinion to reach a decision that 
favored the plaintiff and in another case opinion that favored the defendant. If the case was presided 
over by three judges, which was the norm in appellate court cases, all three judges and their individual 
votes were included in the study as three separate judge/case pairs since each judge made a decision on 
the case before her or him. That is, each judge/case pair was considered to be an independent 
observation in our analyses. The data set included 326 judge/case pairs from the district courts 
(including opinions of magistrate judges) and 102 judge/case pairs from the appellate courts. See 
Federal Judicial History, Magistrate Judges: A Brief History, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/ 
page/magistrate_judges (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (defining federal magistrate judge). Most of the 
district court proceedings dealt with the defendant-employers’ motion for summary judgment, and 
most of the appellate court proceedings dealt with a party’s appeal of the district courts’ holding on a 
motion for summary judgment. Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 77–78.  
 The data indicate similar case outcomes for judges in district courts (21.9% plaintiffs’ success 
rate) as compared to appellate courts (22.5%); magistrate judges (23.4%) as compared to other judges 
(21.6%); single judges (22.4%) as compared to judges on panels (21.4%); and judges who heard more 
than one case (23.2%) as compared to judges who heard only one case (19.5%). None of these 
differences were statistically significant. Thus, we had further assurance that we could study all the 
judge/case pairs as a whole without distinguishing between these various categories of judges. 
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of the data, utilizing multiple methods to learn more about the relationship 
of the judges’ race to their decision making.120 These processes included 
cross-tabulations121 and logistic regression modeling.122 For our analyses, 
 
 
 120. First, we summarized the data that we had collected (“the data set”). Specifically, we counted 
the number of judge/case pairs with particular characteristics (“frequency count” of each variable). 
These frequency counts help us determine if our sample of cases and judges resembles the universe of 
cases and judges. To the extent that our sample resembles the judiciary as a whole, then we have 
additional assurance that our sample is representative and that we might draw inferences about judges 
in all racial harassment cases with more confidence. In addition, the frequency counts help us decide if 
we have enough data on any given characteristic to analyze it meaningfully. 
 Our frequency counts indicated that our data set reasonably resembles the racial and gender 
composition of the federal judiciary as a whole, particularly when you take into account that the cases 
in this study cover a twenty-two year time period and that the percentages of minority judges were 
lower in the earlier part of this period than they are today. For instance, African American judges 
represented 7.8% of the federal judiciary in 1994 and 11% in 2008..See supra Chart 1. African 
American judges constituted 8.5% of our sample. Hispanic judges represented 4.8% of the federal 
judiciary in 1994 and 7.2% in 2008. See supra Chart 1. Hispanic judges constituted 5.3% of our 
sample. Thus, the number of cases with African American and Hispanic judges in our study, while 
small, is a respectable sample, particularly given that the universe of minority federal judges is small 
and evolving. In addition, the statistical procedures used in our study take into account the small 
sample sizes. See infra notes 121–22. In particular, it is more difficult to establish statistically 
significant differences when sample sizes are small. Thus, when significance is found under such 
conditions, we have confidence that significant differences exist. Nonetheless, we view our study as 
exploratory and make generalizations with care. 
 121. As a second step in our statistical analysis, we studied whether particular judges’ 
characteristics (e.g. race, gender, or political affiliation) were associated with the probability of 
plaintiffs’ success or defendants’ success (“cross-tabulations”). Since we mostly had categorical 
variables, we used cell sizes and percentages as summary statistics rather than means and standard 
deviations. These cross-tabulations helped us assess the general decision-making patterns of different 
groups of judges. We focused on case outcomes because they are an objectively determinable measure 
of judges’ decision making (i.e., whether they agreed with plaintiffs’ or defendants’ position), although 
future research may look at more nuanced aspects of judicial decision making. We used chi-square 
tests to determine whether these associations were statistically significant for tables where all cells had 
expected frequency greater than five. For tables with at least one cell with low expected frequency 
(< 5), we used Fisher’s exact test instead.  
  “Statistical significance” is generally expressed as p < .05 or more stringently as p < .01. This 
expression means that the result occurs less than or equal to five times (or one time) out of a hundred. 
When a result occurs this seldom, statisticians assume it did not occur by chance. Each statistical test 
reported with the cross-tabulations compares a single group (e.g. African American judges) against all 
other groups combined (e.g. non–African American judges). As such, these tests are substantially 
overlapping (the comparison between African American and non–African American judges is similar 
to the comparison between White and non-White, for instance), and should not be taken to represent 
mutually independent findings about the relationships among judge characteristics and case outcomes. 
For non-statisticians desiring increased understanding of the above-mentioned statistical techniques, 
see ROBERTA GARNER, THE JOY OF STATS 132–34, 189–201 (2005). For discussion of Fisher’s test, 
see JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 187–90 (3d ed. 2003). 
 122. Based in part on the results of the cross-tabulations, we identified judge and case 
characteristics that individually appeared to make a significant difference in whether plaintiffs 
succeeded or not. We tested these characteristics together in a series of multiple logistic regression 
models. Multiple logistic regression is a statistical procedure that allows us simultaneously to evaluate 
the statistical significance of the association (i.e., larger than would be expected due to chance) 
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we excluded those judge/case pairs with missing data.123 Given that a 
preliminary analysis indicated that judges in federal district courts and 
appellate courts have comparable decision-making patterns in racial 
harassment cases, we decided to analyze all cases as one sample.124  
B. Results of the Statistical Analyses  
Our study explores how judge characteristics are related to judicial 
decision making. In particular, we examined whether judges’ race affected 
the judges holding for plaintiffs or not. In part because other researchers 
have considered how judges’ gender and political affiliation are related to 
case outcomes,125 we also included these characteristics in our initial 
analysis. A more formalistic model of judicial decision making126 also 
would predict that the factual merits of the case are critical, so we included 
in our study certain plaintiffs’ claims of racial harassment that our earlier 
 
 
between multiple judge or case characteristics and whether plaintiffs are successful. DAVID W. 
HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 70–79 (2d ed. 2000). By testing 
multiple variables simultaneously in this way, we can evaluate whether each characteristic has a 
statistically significant relationship with case outcome, while controlling for all others. Logistic 
regressions also provide a unified framework in which to examine and test interaction effects, which 
indicate whether two (or more) variables together have an effect different than would be expected from 
knowledge of their individual effects alone. Finally, we tested for statistical interactions between 
variables in the logistic regression models—that is, whether the effect of each variable on case 
outcome depends in magnitude and/or direction of the value of another variable. For non-statisticians 
desiring further understanding of the above-mentioned techniques, see GARNER, supra note 121, at 
156–57; COHEN ET AL., supra note 121, at 354–86, 482–522. 
 Logistic regression allows us to quantify the strength of each association by providing estimates of 
the odds ratios (“OR”) for each characteristic. The OR is the ratio between the odds of plaintiff’s 
success with a certain judge/case characteristic to the odds of success without that characteristic. 
Logistic regression provides odds ratio calculations performed simultaneously for each variable in the 
model, while controlling for all other variables. See generally J. Martin Bland & Douglas G. Altman, 
Statistics Notes: The Odds Ratio, 320 BMJ 1468 (2000), available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/ 
full/320/7247/1468 (further explaining odds ratios).  
 If a variable has no effect on case outcomes, the probability of plaintiffs’ success will be the same 
for both groups of judges, and the odds ratio would be 1.0. Departures from 1.0 in either direction 
indicate an association between that variable and case outcomes. An odds ratio greater than 1.0 
indicates an increased likelihood that plaintiffs will be successful and an odds ratio less than 1.0 
indicates an increased likelihood that plaintiffs will be unsuccessful. 
 We also performed a measure of the overall explanatory power of each model. We calculated 
Nagelkerke’s generalized R2 as a measure of the overall explanatory power of each fitted model. R2 
represents the proportion of the variance in case outcome explained by the variables in the model 
alone. N. J. D. Nagelkerke, A Note on a General Definition of the Coefficient of Determination, 78 
BIOMETRIKA 691, 691–92 (1991). 
 123. See infra Appendix A. 
 124. See supra note 119.  
 125. See supra note 59. 
 126. See text accompanying supra note 56. 
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empirical work indicated as meaningfully related to case outcomes.127 
Finally, we analyzed whether the plaintiffs’ race made a difference. 
As we delve more deeply into the study’s results, keep in mind that 
defendants are much more likely than plaintiffs to win these judicial 
proceedings. On average, as shown in Table 3, plaintiffs were successful 
about 22% of the time, or about one in five cases. This baseline measure 
helps put the decision-making patterns of any one group of judges into 
perspective. Thus, when a group of cases deviates considerably from this 
baseline, it is particularly noteworthy. 
1. Analysis 1: Cross-tabulations of Individual Variables with Case 
Outcomes 
a. Judges’ Characteristics. Our data indicate very different decision-
making patterns for judges of different races. In cases where African 
American judges presided, plaintiffs had the highest success rate (45.8%), 
as shown in Table 3. In other words, plaintiffs who appear before African 
American judges are almost as likely to win as to lose. This success rate is 
significantly higher than in cases presided over by judges of other races 
considered together (p = .004)128 and is also remarkable because it is well 
above the baseline average of 22%. This result is consistent with other 
research that African American judges are more likely than White judges 
to find for plaintiff employees in employment discrimination cases 
generally.129 
As shown in Table 3, in contrast to cases heard by African American 
judges, the plaintiffs’ success rate with White and Hispanic judges is much 
lower. Cases with Hispanic judges had the lowest plaintiffs’ success rate 
(19%), followed closely by White judges (20.6%). The plaintiffs’ success 
rate for Hispanic judges was not significantly different from that for 
judges of all other races taken together,130 while the plaintiffs’ success rate 
for White judges was significantly different from that for all minority 
judges taken together (p = .05). The statistically significant results are 
driven primarily by the difference in success rate for African American 
and White judges, and indicate that this difference is unlikely to be due to 
chance alone. 
 
 
 127. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 86–88, 106.  
 128. See supra note 120 (explaining “p” value).  
 129. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text. 
 130. When Hispanic judges are compared to all other judges, the latter group is composed mostly 
of White judges. Since plaintiffs’ success rate for Hispanic judges is similar to that for White judges, it 
is not surprising that no statistically significant difference occurs.  
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Our data included too few cases with Asian American judges to make 
meaningful observations. Hopefully, as Asian American and Native 
American judges become more numerous, empirical studies will be able to 
analyze their decision-making patterns as well. As we observed, the 
number of cases in our study where African American and Hispanic 
judges preside is small, but the number is acceptable for most analyses in 
our exploratory study.131 When they are not, we note it accordingly. 
 
 
 131. See supra note 120. 
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TABLE 3: CROSS-TABULATIONS OF JUDGE CHARACTERISTICS, CASE 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND PLAINTIFFS’ RACE BY CASE OUTCOMES 
Plaintiffs 
Successful 
Plaintiffs 
UnsuccessfulComparison 
N % N % 
χ2 
(1df) p 
All cases 94 22.0 334 78.0
Judge characteristics 
African American judges vs. all other judges 8.3 .004
African American judge (N = 24) 11 45.8 13 54.2
Others (N = 374) 77 20.6 297 79.4
Hispanic judges vs. all other judges * 1.00
Hispanic judge (N = 21) 4 19.0 17 81.0
Others (N = 377) 84 22.3 293 77.7
Asian American judges vs. all other judges * .53
Asian American judge (N = 3) 1 33.3 2 66.7
Others (N = 395) 87 22.0 308 78.0
White judges vs. all other judges 4.0 .05
White judge (N = 350) 72 20.6 278 79.4
Others (N = 48) 16 33.3 32 66.6
Female vs. Male judges 0.7 .40
Female judge (N = 78) 20 25.6 58 74.4
Male judge (N = 348) 74 21.3 274 78.7
Republican vs. Democratic judges 8.4 .004
Republican judge (N = 235) 40 17.0 195 83.0
Democratic judge (N = 164) 48 29.3 116 70.7
Case characteristics 
Racial slurs vs. no racial slurs 21.5 <.001
Racial slurs (N = 247) 74 30.0 173 70.0
No racial slurs (N = 180) 20 11.1 160 88.9
Both supervisor & coworker harassment vs. not both 21.0 <.001
Both supervisor & coworker harassment (N = 116) 43 37.1 73 62.9
Not both (N = 311) 51 16.4 260 83.6
Plaintiff characteristics 
African American plaintiff vs. all other plaintiffs 2.5 .12
African American plaintiff (N = 300) 59 19.7 241 80.3
Others (N = 71) 20 28.2 51 71.8
Hispanic plaintiff vs. all other plaintiffs 2.4 .12
Hispanic plaintiff (N = 20) 7 35.0 13 65.0
Others (N = 351) 72 20.5 279 79.5
Asian American plaintiff vs. all other plaintiffs * .32
Asian American plaintiff (N = 14) 1 7.1 13 92.9
Others (N = 357) 78 21.8 279 78.2
White plaintiff vs. all other plaintiffs 3.0 .08
White plaintiff (N = 37) 12 32.4 25 67.6
Others (N = 334) 67 20.1 267 79.9
* Fisher’s exact test used for tables with at least one cell with expected frequency < 5. 
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Like judges’ race, political affiliation appeared significant to case 
outcomes. We, like other researchers,132 use the party of the President that 
appoints that judge as a proxy for the political affiliation of the judge. As 
shown in Table 3, judges appointed by a Democratic President 
(“Democratic judges”) held for the plaintiff in 29.3% of the cases, in 
contrast to judges appointed by a Republican President (“Republican 
judges”) who held for the plaintiff only 17% of the time. These differences 
in decision-making patterns were statistically significant (p = .004). 
What is striking about the judges’ gender was its lack of relevance to 
case outcomes, as indicated in Table 3. Unlike Crowe’s findings that 
judges’ gender in sexual harassment cases made a difference to 
outcome,133 our data did not indicate any significant differences between 
the way female judges and male judges decided racial harassment cases. 
Female judges found for the plaintiffs in 25.6% of the cases and male 
judges found for the plaintiff in 21.3% of the cases—a small difference 
that could be attributable to chance. Consequently, we dropped gender 
from all further analyses. 
b. Case Characteristics. As we discussed earlier,134 in order for 
plaintiffs to prove that an employer has violated Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, plaintiffs must show they experienced harassment that 
was “severe or pervasive” and “because of race.” Thus, one could 
technically argue that the law would not be broken if a judge or jury 
believed that racial harassment had occurred but that it was not sufficiently 
severe or pervasive, or, in the alternative, if employees were severely or 
pervasively harassed but for reasons other than race. While the Supreme 
Court has stated these legal principles, federal appellate and district court 
judges continue to have substantial discretion in determining whether 
plaintiffs have met this burden. Judges are asked, for instance, to consider 
“all the circumstances” without clear guidance on the relevant factors.135 
In our earlier study, judges appeared to pay particular attention to 
harassment that was blatantly racist, such as harassers who used racial 
slurs or brandished racist objects (such as nooses or Ku Klux Klan 
attire).136 We speculated that judges considered this evidence of the 
severity and the racial basis of the harassment.137 In addition, judges 
 
 
 132. See supra note 54.  
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 79–87. 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 107–14. 
 135. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).  
 136. Chew & Kelley, supra note 97, at 87–88. 
 137. Id. at 106–07. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] MYTH OF THE COLOR-BLIND JUDGE 1145 
 
 
 
 
seemed mindful of whether plaintiffs were harassed by their supervisors 
and their coworkers, rather than one or the other.138 We presumed judges 
considered this evidence of the pervasiveness of the harassment and 
general hostility toward the plaintiffs.139 We specifically found that in 
cases with racial slurs or harassment by both the supervisors and 
coworkers, plaintiffs were significantly more likely to prevail (even 
though plaintiffs’ overall success rate remained low).140 In cases where 
plaintiffs did not make these claims, but instead argued that more subtle 
forms of racial harassment (such as demeaning comments, less attractive 
work assignments, and work/social isolation) had occurred, plaintiffs were 
likely to lose at a higher rate than the baseline.141 
This current study added an additional year of data to the earlier one 
and retested the relationship between case outcomes and racial slurs or 
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers. As shown in Table 3, we 
confirmed the earlier patterns. When plaintiffs claimed racial slurs, judges 
found in their favor 30% of the time. In contrast, when plaintiffs did not 
make these claims, they were successful only 11% of the time. When 
plaintiffs claimed evidence of being harassed by both supervisors and 
coworkers, they were successful 37% of the time, in comparison to 16% of 
the time when they did not make this claim. These results were statistically 
significant (p = <.001). 
c. Plaintiffs’ Race. We considered whether the plaintiffs’ race made a 
difference to judges of different races. As shown in Table 3, cross-
tabulations between the plaintiffs’ race and case outcomes resulted in 
some interesting comparisons. White and Hispanic plaintiffs exhibited the 
highest win rates (32.4% and 35%, respectively), African American and 
Asian American plaintiffs markedly lower ones (19.7% and 7.1%, 
respectively). However, these outcomes were not statistically significant 
and so could have occurred by chance.142 
2. Analysis 2: Logistic Regression of Judges’ Race on Case Outcomes 
The cross-tabulations give us information about the general decision-
making patterns of judges. Another versatile statistical method, logistic 
regression, provides an alternative process for assessing whether certain 
 
 
 138. Id. at 86–87. 
 139. Id. at 106–07. 
 140. Id. at 86–87.  
 141. Id. at 86–88.  
 142. While not significant in these cross-tabulations, a logistic regression model did indicate a 
significant relationship between particular plaintiffs’ race and case outcomes. See infra note 150. 
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variables, such as judges’ race, are relevant to the outcome of these 
cases.143 
We began our logistic regressions by testing the overall significance of 
judges’ race without consideration of other variables. Because of the small 
number of Asian American judges, we included only White, African 
American and Hispanic judges in these and subsequent analyses. In each 
model, we tested the overall contribution of race (i.e., whether the model 
that takes race into account predicts outcomes significantly better than a 
model that does not). Given our interests in comparing White versus 
minority judges, we also investigated the specific differences between 
African American and White judges and between Hispanic and White 
judges. 
Consistent with the findings in our cross-tabulations, the logistic 
regression indicates that judges’ race in general is clearly associated with 
case outcomes. As indicated in the first line in Table 4, the overall 
association between race and outcome is statistically significant (p = 
.02).144 
TABLE 4: MODEL WITH JUDGES’ RACE 
Variable Odds Ratio Significance Level 
Judges’ Race  .02 
African American 
Judge 
v. White Judge 3.3 .006 
Hispanic Judge 
v. White Judge 0.9 .87 
 
 
 143. See supra note 122 (explaining logistic regression). We evaluated the explanatory power of 
each of our logistic regression models by calculating Nagelkerke’s R2. R2 ranges from zero to one and 
can be interpreted as the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable (here, plaintiff success) 
accounted for by the independent variables (judges’ race, judges’ political party, presence of racial 
slurs and/or presence of both coworker and supervisor harassment). The values of R2 observed in our 
models ranged from R2 = .03 for the model which included only judges’ race as an independent 
variable to R2 = .17 for the model including all four independent variables. While these values may not 
seem very large and do not indicate that we can use these characteristics to predict the outcome of a 
specific case with very great accuracy, they are nevertheless typical of modest but real associations 
often reported in the social science literature. Indeed, the R2 value of .17 corresponds to a “medium” 
effect size in the widely used nomenclature given by Cohen. JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER 
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 80 (2d ed. 1988). For further explanation of the meaning 
of R2, see COHEN ET AL., supra note 121, at 91–95. A value of .03 is considered typical of a “small” 
effect in Cohen’s classification. Id. at 79.  
 144. Appendix B provides more results for the logistic regression models, including confidence 
intervals for the odds ratio, chi-square, and degrees of freedom. See also supra note 120 (explaining 
“p” value).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] MYTH OF THE COLOR-BLIND JUDGE 1147 
 
 
 
 
A closer look at the data, moreover, show some of the same interesting 
distinctions between the races that we saw in the cross-tabulations. For 
instance, the cross-tabulations indicated that African American judges held 
for the plaintiffs much more often than White judges.145 As shown in 
Table 4, the logistic regression further confirmed this result, finding that 
the odds are 3.3 times higher (the “odds ratio”)146 that plaintiffs will be 
successful when the judge is African American than when the judge is 
White. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that this relationship is highly 
significant (p = .006), and therefore is not likely to be a product of chance. 
In contrast, the logistic regression suggests that it does not make a 
significant difference to case outcomes whether the judge is Hispanic as 
compared to White. 
3. Analysis 3: Judges’ Race with Judges’ Political Affiliation and 
Plaintiffs’ Claims 
While the cross-tabulations in Analysis 1 indicated that judges’ race 
was relevant (as did the logistic regressions in Analysis 2), they also 
indicated that judges’ political affiliation and certain case characteristics 
associated with the merits of plaintiffs’ claims (claims of racial slurs and 
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers) also significantly affect 
cases outcomes. Thus, we performed more detailed analyses with judges’ 
race to gain further insight into what might be occurring. For instance, we 
considered judges’ race and political affiliation simultaneously (e.g., 
White Democratic judges or African American Republican judges) in 
relation to their decision making. Keep in mind, however, that this 
subgrouping results in smaller samples in each cell, resulting in reduced 
statistical power for significance tests. Consequently, we did not do the 
same type of cross-tabulation analysis for significance as we did in 
Analysis 1.147 
Instead, the first table in each pair of tables below (for example, Table 
5) only reports the number and percentage of cases in each cell. The 
second table of each pair of tables (for example, Table 6), however, is part 
of a series of logistic regression models that considered the effect of each 
of these additional variables with judges’ race. Logistic regression allows 
us to test the effect of judges’ race while controlling for the effect of other 
variables such as judges’ political affiliation. In this way, we can isolate 
 
 
 145. See supra Table 3.  
 146. See supra note 122 (explaining “odds ratio”).  
 147. See supra note 121. 
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the effect of each variable on plaintiffs’ success or failure, thus accounting 
for the possibility that judges’ race is a proxy for something else, such as 
political affiliation. 
Since the cross-tabulations in Analysis 1 indicated that judges’ 
gender148 and plaintiffs’ race149 did not significantly affect case outcomes, 
we do not discuss them further in the text of the this Article. Nonetheless, 
logistic regression modeling indicated some interesting results on 
plaintiffs’ race that warrants revisiting in the future.150 
 
 
 148. See supra Table 3. 
 149. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.  
 150. When we considered judges’ race and plaintiffs’ race simultaneously with case outcomes, we 
found that White judges were more likely to favor defendant-employers regardless of plaintiffs’ race. 
Even so, White judges were much more inclined to hold for White plaintiffs (32%) and Hispanic 
plaintiffs (41%) than for plaintiffs of other races. When appearing before White judges, African 
American plaintiffs were about twice as likely to lose their cases as White and Hispanic plaintiffs, and 
Asian American plaintiffs lost all their eleven cases before White judges. These simple differences in 
case outcomes suggest that White judges are less likely to find credible allegations of racial 
harassment from African American and Asian American plaintiffs. Consequently, further research is 
warranted to test this finding.  
TABLE D: PLAINTIFFS’ SUCCESS BY JUDGES’ RACE AND PLAINTIFFS’ RACE 
 African American Judges White Judges 
 
African 
American 
Pl. 
Hispanic 
Pl. 
Asian 
American 
Pl. 
White 
Pl. 
African 
American 
Pl. 
Hispanic 
Pl. 
Asian 
American 
Pl. 
White 
Pl. 
Pl. 
Successful 
7 
(43.8%) 
1 
(50.0%) -- 
3 
(60.0%)
46 
(18.7%) 
7 
(41.2%)
0 
(0%) 
10 
(32.3%)
Pl. 
Unsuccessful 
9 
(56.3%) 
1 
(50.0%) -- 
2 
(40.0%)
200 
(81.3%) 
10 
(58.8%)
11 
(100%) 
21 
(67.7%)
Totals 16 (100%) 
2 
(100%) -- 
5 
(100%)
246 
(100%) 
17 
(100%) 
11 
(100%) 
31 
(100%)
 
 In comparison, African American judges were more inclined than White judges to hold for the 
plaintiffs, with plaintiffs across all racial groups having closer to a fifty–fifty chance for success, 
which is much higher than the baseline of 22%. Although the number of cases is small, the data 
suggests that African American judges do not particularly distinguish among plaintiffs of different 
races, with White plaintiffs about as likely to be successful as African American plaintiffs. Again, 
further research is warranted. Because most plaintiffs are African American and most judges are 
White, the number of other judge and plaintiff combinations was very limited. 
 Our exploratory logistic regression modeling indicates some significant findings between 
plaintiffs’ race and case outcomes. In a first model with judges’ race and African American versus 
White plaintiffs, judges’ race was significant but plaintiffs’ race was not. However, a second model 
with judges’ race and African American plaintiffs versus White and Hispanic plaintiffs indicated that 
judges’ race was significant and also the contrast between African American plaintiffs versus White 
and Hispanic plaintiffs was significant. This suggests that White and Hispanic plaintiffs’ relatively 
high win rate is not occurring by chance, and that being White or Hispanic increases one’s chance of 
winning. At the same time, the significant effect of judges’ race remains stable. 
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a. Judges’ Race and Political Affiliation. As shown in Table 5, judges’ 
political affiliation makes more of a difference for some racial groups than 
for others. African American Democratic judges and African American 
Republican judges have comparable decision-making patterns, both 
groups finding for the plaintiff much more frequently than average (47% 
and 43%, respectively). In contrast, plaintiffs coming before White 
Democratic judges have a notably higher win rate (27.1%) than those 
coming before White Republican judges (16.6%). While the sample is 
small, it also appears that the political affiliation of Hispanic judges results 
in different case outcomes, with Hispanic Democratic judges more likely 
to favor plaintiffs than Hispanic Republican judges. For both White and 
Hispanic Republican judges, the plaintiffs’ win rate is well below the 
baseline for all cases of 22%. The number of cases with Asian American 
judges was too small to be meaningful. 
TABLE 5: PLAINTIFFS’ SUCCESS BY JUDGES’ RACE AND POLITICAL 
AFFILIATION 
JUDGES’ RACE 
 African 
American Hispanic All Minorities White 
 Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. 
Plaintiffs 
Successful 
8 
(47.1%) 
3 
(42.9%) 
3 
(30.0%) 
1 
(9.1%)
12 
(40.0%)
4 
(22.2%)
36 
(27.1%)
36 
(16.6%)
Plaintiffs 
Unsuccessful 
9 
(52.9%) 
4 
(57.1%) 
7 
(70.0%) 
10 
(90.9%)
18 
(60%)
14 
(77.8%)
97 
(72.9%)
181 
(83.4%)
Totals 17 (100%) 
7 
(100%) 
10 
(100%) 
11 
(100%)
30 
(100%)
18 
(100%)
133 
(100%)
217 
(100%)
TABLE 6: MODEL WITH JUDGES’ RACE AND JUDGES’ POLITICAL 
AFFILIATION 
Variable Odds Ratio Significance Level 
Judges’ Race  .07 
African American Judge  
v. White Judge 2.72 .02 
Republican Judge 
v. Democratic Judge .53 .01 
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As shown in Table 6, the results of logistic regression analysis also are 
striking.151 Having a Republican judge rather than a Democratic judge is 
negatively associated with the plaintiff’s success. Specifically, the odds 
are .53 times less likely for the plaintiff to be successful when the judge is 
Republican than when she or he is Democratic. Logistic regression 
analysis, moreover, confirms that the effect of judges’ race is generally 
stable even when controlling for political affiliation. While the overall 
effect of race narrowly missed the significant threshold of .05 in this 
model,152 the effect of the judge being African American rather than White 
remains significant (p = .02) even after taking into account whether the 
judge is a Democratic or a Republican appointee and vice-versa. Since 
these relationships are statistically significant, they are unlikely to have 
occurred by chance.  
b. Judges’ Race and Racial Slurs. We also considered the association 
between judges’ race and cases in which the plaintiff complains about an 
explicit form of racial harassment—the harasser’s use of racial slurs. As 
we earlier discussed,153 judges seem to consider racial slurs as evidence of 
two key elements of the claim: that the harassment was (1) sufficiently 
“severe or pervasive” and (2) “because of race.” As shown in Table 7, 
minority judges are much more likely to find for the plaintiff if racial slurs 
are present. Indeed, there is a 60% success rate for these plaintiffs when 
before African American judges. Plaintiffs who complain of racial slurs 
before White judges are about twice as likely to lose than if they complain 
to African American judges, with a success rate of only 27.6%.  
The percentage increase in plaintiffs’ success rate when they claim 
racial slurs before African Americans judges or White judges, however, is 
comparable. Compared to African American judges’ overall baseline of a 
46% plaintiffs’ win rate,154 plaintiffs alleging racial slurs had a 60% win 
rate, representing a 30% increase. Compared to White judges’ baseline of 
 
 
 151. As indicated in Table 4, the difference between Hispanic judges and White judges in their 
case holdings was not statistically significant (i.e., the difference may be occurring by chance). 
Similarly, in the remaining logistic regression models, the difference also was not significant (p = 
between .78 and .99). To simplify the remaining tables in the text, we did not include this data in the 
tables here but the data is included in Appendix B.  
 152. The observation of the overall race effect losing significance with the addition of another 
variable to the model is a common phenomenon in regression models. Adding more variables entails 
estimating more model parameters, which in turn causes the uncertainty in all other estimates to grow. 
However, since the African American judge versus White judge comparison remained significant and 
the magnitude of the odds ratio for this comparison is relatively stable, we are confident in our 
conclusion that this racial effect is stable when controlling for political affiliation. 
 153. See discussion accompanying supra notes 133–35. 
 154. See supra Table 3. 
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20.6% plaintiffs’ win rate,155 plaintiffs alleging racial slurs had a 27.6% 
win rate, representing a 34% increase.156 
As shown in Table 8, when we consider the judges’ race and the 
plaintiffs’ claim of racial slurs, the analysis indicates that plaintiffs who 
make this claim increase their odds for success substantially (OR = 3.4). 
Furthermore, the effect of the judge being African American rather than 
White remains significant (p = .008). 
TABLE 7: PLAINTIFFS’ SUCCESS BY JUDGES’ RACE AND CLAIMS OF 
RACIAL SLURS 
 JUDGES’ RACE  
  African American Hispanic 
Asian 
American All Minorities White 
Plaintiffs Successful 
When Racial Slurs 
Claimed 
9 (60%) 4 (40%) 1 (33.3%) 14 (50%) 54 (27.6%)
Plaintiffs 
Unsuccessful When 
Racial Slurs 
Claimed 
6 (40%) 6 (60%) 2 (66.7)% 14 (50%) 142 (72.4%)
Totals 15 (100%) 10 (100%) 3 (100%) 28 (100%) 196 (100%)
TABLE 8: MODEL WITH JUDGES’ RACE AND RACIAL SLURS 
Variable Odds Ratio Significance Level 
Judges’ Race  .03 
African American Judge 
v. White Judge 3.3  .008 
Racial Slurs 3.4 <.001 
 
 
 155. See supra Table 3. 
 156. Compared to Hispanic judges’ baseline of 19% plaintiffs’ win rate (shown in Table 3), 
plaintiffs with racial slurs had a 40% win rate (110% increase). However, the number of cases is so 
small that it is difficult to generalize from this result. But see supra note 120 (explaining small sample 
sizes).  
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c. Judges’ Race and Composition of Harassers. As we earlier 
discussed,157 judges as a group appear to consider harassment by both 
supervisors and coworkers as an indicator of the pervasiveness of the 
harassment and the general hostility in the work environment, thus 
bolstering the plaintiff’s case. In contrast to the results for racial slurs,158 
White and African American judges exhibited comparable decision-
making patterns in cases where the plaintiffs made this claim, as indicated 
in Table 9. Plaintiffs are successful 37.2% of the time before White judges 
and 46.2% of the time before African American judges. These data 
suggest that both White and African American judges associate this claim 
with a finding of racial harassment. Keep in mind, however, that the 
increase in plaintiffs’ success when this claim is present is much greater 
for White than for African American judges. Compared to White judges’ 
baseline of 20.6% plaintiffs’ win rate,159 plaintiffs who claimed 
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers won 37.2% of the time 
(81% increase).160 The percentage increase in plaintiffs’ success for 
African American judges is very slight.161 The number of these cases with 
Hispanic judges was too small to allow meaningful observations. 
TABLE 9: PLAINTIFFS’ SUCCESS BY JUDGES’ RACE AND COMPOSITION OF 
HARASSERS 
 JUDGES’ RACE 
  African American Hispanic 
Asian 
American
All 
Minorities White 
Plaintiffs Successful 
When Both Supervisor & 
Coworkers Harassers 
6 (46.2%) 1 (33.3%) — 7 (43.8%) 35 (37.2%)
Plaintiffs Unsuccessful 
When Both Supervisor & 
Coworkers Harassers  
7 (53.8%) 2 (66.7%) — 9 (56.3%) 59 (62.8%)
Totals 13 (100%) 3 (100%)  16 (100%) 94 (100%)
 
 
 157. See supra discussion accompanying notes 140–41. 
 158. See supra Tables 7 and 8. 
 159. See supra Table 3.  
 160. Given the disproportionate number of White judges, their reaction to this claim is probably 
driving the impact on case outcomes as a whole. 
 161. 45.8% versus 46.2%.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] MYTH OF THE COLOR-BLIND JUDGE 1153 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 10: MODEL WITH JUDGES’ RACE AND COMPOSITION OF 
HARASSERS 
Variable Odds Ratio Significance Level 
Judges’ Race  .12 
African American Judge 
v. White Judge 2.5 .04 
Harassment by Both 
Supervisors & Coworkers 3.1 <.001 
 
As shown in Table 10, the plaintiffs’ claims that both supervisors and 
coworkers harassed them also significantly improves their odds of success 
(OR = 3.1). Furthermore, the difference in outcome between African 
American and White judges remained significant (p = .04). 
d. All Variables. Finally, we designed a logistic regression model to 
test simultaneously all the variables described above. As shown in Table 
11, this cumulative analysis showed that plaintiffs’ claims of racial slurs or 
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers increases the odds of 
plaintiffs succeeding, but having a presiding Republican judge harms the 
plaintiffs’ chances for success. All of these relationships were statistically 
significant. In particular, this logistic regression model of all variables 
predicts the following:  
(1) The odds are .5 times less likely for plaintiffs to be successful 
when the judge is Republican (rather than a Democrat);  
(2) The odds are 2.7 times higher that plaintiffs will be successful 
when they allege racial slurs; and 
(3) The odds are 2.5 times higher that plaintiffs will be successful if 
the alleged harassers are both supervisors and coworkers. 
TABLE 11: MODEL WITH ALL VARIABLES 
Variable Odds Ratio Significance Level 
Judges’ Race  .25 
African American Judge 
vs. White Judge 2.2 .10 
Republican Judge  
vs. Democratic Judge 0.5 .003 
Racial Slurs 2.7 .001 
Harassment by Both 
Supervisors & Coworkers 2.5 .001 
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The race of the judge continued to have a strong effect on the outcome 
of the case (OR = 2.2 for African American judges as compared to White 
judges), but this effect was no longer quite statistically significant in this 
model (p = .10). This means that we can have less confidence that the 
observed differences in success rate of cases heard by White and African 
American judges are not due to chance. As noted above,162 a typical trait 
of regression models is that increasing the number of independent 
variables increases our uncertainty in the effect of each variable. However, 
we feel that the magnitude of the odds ratio for the comparison between 
African American and White judges and the consistent results of all the 
other models provide strong evidence that judges’ race is meaningful to 
case outcomes, even when controlling for several other important 
variables.163  
e. Interaction of All Variables. Our analyses thus far have indicated 
that each variable (judges’ race, judges’ political affiliation, and plaintiffs’ 
claims of racial slurs and harassment by both supervisors and coworkers) 
is significant on its own in affecting case outcomes, a condition 
statisticians call “main effects.”164 Furthermore, our analyses assume that 
these effects are additive, so that judges’ race, judges’ political affiliation, 
and plaintiffs’ claims are each independently meaningful. Thus, having a 
White judge decreases a plaintiff’s chance for success, and having a 
Republican judge decreases a plaintiff’s chance for success further and 
independently of having a White judge. Similarly, having an African 
American judge increases a plaintiff’s chance for success; plus, claims of 
racial slurs increase the plaintiff’s chances even more, independently of 
the judge’s race. For example, our earlier logistic regression model 
predicted that plaintiffs appearing before an African American judge 
increase their odds of winning 3.3 times and having a case involving racial 
slurs increase their odds of winning by 3.4 times.165 Thus, plaintiffs in 
cases with both conditions would benefit from the additive effect. 
 
 
 162. See supra note 152. 
 163. The results of this final model do seem to indicate that accounting for judges’ political 
affiliation, racial slurs and harassment by both supervisors and coworkers simultaneously does reduce 
the additional explanatory power of judges’ race. This is in part attributable to the small number of 
African American judges as compared to White judges. As their absolute numbers and relative 
percentages increase to be comparable to the other variables, such as the Republican-Democratic 
comparison, we would expect their statistical effect to be more powerful. 
 164. See supra note 121. 
 165. See supra Table 8. 
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In addition to the above analyses, we also performed a series of 
multiple-logistic regression models to discover any interactive effects 
between the variables; that is whether a multiplicative effect exists. For 
instance, does the judge being African American while simultaneously 
having a case with racial slurs result in a heightened effect beyond the 
additive effect described above? Our analyses did not provide any 
evidence that it does. We tested every possible two-way interaction 
between the variables in Table 11 (judges’ race, judges’ political party, 
presence versus absence of racial slurs, and presence versus absence of 
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers). The results showed no 
statistically significant interaction effects between the judges’ race and any 
of the other variables.166 However, we stress that the small sample sizes 
for non-White judges limit the statistical power to detect all but the 
strongest interactions and, as such, our absence of interaction findings here 
should not be taken as positive evidence that such interactions do not, in 
fact, exist. 
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
While judges have historically been White, a modern influx of 
minorities into the judiciary has changed the institution’s racial 
composition and resulted in a larger but still unrepresentative proportion 
of minority judges. Disagreement exists, however, about how a larger 
minority presence on the bench would affect legal institutions. Under a 
more formalist model of judicial decision making, all judges, whether 
White or minority, are guided by presumably objective and race-neutral 
legal principles and interpretations.167 Thus, White and minority judges, 
even if they were inclined, do not have the discretion to affect judicial 
results in a unique way. The merits of the case are the key to case 
outcomes. Thus, under this formalist model, it makes little difference to 
case outcomes if all the judges are White, minority, or some combination. 
In contrast, a realist model168 would posit that the personal attributes of 
judges meaningfully affect the way they make judicial decisions. A 
homogeneous judiciary of Whites differs from one made up of a more 
racially diverse judiciary because each racial group has different 
viewpoints. Individuals’ social location in our race-sensitive social system 
affects their experiences and their consciousness both within and beyond 
 
 
 166. See infra Appendix C. 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 168. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
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legal settings. Judges do not leave race “at the door” when entering the 
courtroom. Rather, their social and cultural experiences are the raw 
material for their interpretation of laws, just as they are for their ongoing 
construction of social life generally.  
A. Judges’ Race and Case Outcomes 
Our empirical study of over 400 federal workplace racial harassment 
cases between 1981 and 2003169 resulted in striking yet sometimes 
nuanced findings. In a nutshell, our results provide evidence of both the 
formalist model and the realist model of judicial decision making. We 
found that the race of judges matters, as does their political affiliation. On 
the other hand, our findings also indicate that judges of all races are 
attentive to the merits of the case.  
Our work initially confirms certain characteristics of racial harassment 
cases: the vast majority of the judges are White; the vast majority of the 
plaintiff-employees are African American; the vast majority of accused 
harassers are White; and that, when studying case outcomes, plaintiff-
employees have a very poor win rate in general—succeeding in only 22% 
of cases overall. Furthermore, the statistical analyses consistently showed 
that the race of the judge can make a significant difference. While 
plaintiffs have a poor win rate in general, they are much more likely to win 
if their cases come before African American rather than White judges. 
Plaintiffs are successful in 46% of their cases before African American 
judges but less than half as often before White judges; logistic regression 
analysis indicated that on average, plaintiffs before African American 
judges are 3.3 times more likely to win than before White judges.170 
Thus, while we cannot predict how any individual judge might act, our 
study results strongly suggest that African American judges as a group and 
White judges as a group perceive racial harassment differently. Racial 
harassment law asks judges to determine if the claims of plaintiffs, who 
are most often African American, are credible. These determinations often 
boil down to two key inquiries: (1) Did the plaintiffs suffer harassment 
 
 
 169. While the first case to recognize the racial harassment doctrine, Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 
234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), occurred in 1971, the first case in our sample 
occurred in 1981. 
 170. Interestingly, the decision-making patterns of Hispanic judges were very similar to White 
judges, holding for plaintiffs in only 19% of their cases. See supra Table 3. Keep in mind, however, 
that unlike the results for African American and White judges, the results for Hispanic judges were not 
significantly different from other races and therefore could have occurred by chance. But see supra 
note 130. 
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because of their race (rather than for some reason unrelated to racial 
animus)?; and (2) Was the harassment so “severe or pervasive” that it 
resulted in a hostile work environment? African Americans and Whites 
apparently subscribe to different worldviews. Our study results suggest 
that if presented with comparable facts, they often reach different 
conclusions about whether discrimination is present. Our findings indicate 
that judges are not different from people in general. Although society has 
made progress, racial harassment and discrimination continue to pervade 
American life.171 African American judges can personally identify with 
instances of discriminatory treatment. Thus, when plaintiffs describe being 
racially harassed, African American judges can imagine that possibility—
have a racial consciousness—in a way that White judges do not.172 
Even in sexual harassment lawsuits, judges as a group are more likely 
to empathize with the female plaintiffs who claim that a male supervisor 
or coworker has sexually harassed them.173 Female judges find sexual 
harassment a plausible possibility, given the pervasiveness of sexual 
harassment in American society. We hypothesize that male judges also are 
more open to plaintiffs’ sexual harassment complaints because of their 
 
 
 171. The recent presidential campaign process provided examples of explicit racism. See Jim 
Geraghty, Just in Time for West Virginia, A Spotlight on Racist Anti-Obama Voters, NATIONAL 
REVIEW ONLINE, May 13, 2008, http://campaignspot.nationalreview.com/post/?q=YjgwY2ZhMjg 
0MWRiODgzMmFkOWRlMWZkNjQ1MDhlYzg=; Kevin Merida, Racist Incidents Give Some 
Obama Campaigners Pause, WASH. POST, May 13, 2008, at A01.  
 172. Furthermore, our analyses provide tentative evidence that White judges may find it more 
difficult to identify with plaintiffs of some races than others on their harassment claims. As described 
in detail above, supra note 150, before White judges, African American plaintiffs were about twice as 
likely to lose as White plaintiffs, and Asian Americans lost every case. Interestingly, White judges 
were about as favorably disposed toward Hispanic plaintiffs as White plaintiffs. This result could 
reflect White judges’ ambivalence about Hispanics’ racial identify, perhaps perceiving them as White, 
or it might be explained by particularly strong plaintiffs’ arguments in the relatively small number of 
cases in which Hispanics were plaintiffs. Keep in mind, however, that the distributions of plaintiffs of 
different races against judges of different races for the most part produced small numbers of cases in 
each cell, making statistical conclusions difficult. 
 While there are fewer cases to study, it tentatively appears that African American judges can more 
readily empathize with plaintiffs across races. The win rate was about the same for White plaintiffs, 
African American plaintiffs, and Hispanic plaintiffs that came before them—with about half of all 
these plaintiffs winning, a rate well above the 22% baseline. See supra Table 3. Hispanic judges heard 
mainly cases with African American plaintiffs, and held in their favor only 20% of the time. See supra 
Table 3. It could be that Hispanic judges, like White judges, cannot readily identify with African 
American plaintiffs. It also could be that Hispanic judges are more likely to hold extremely high 
standards for racial harassment claims regardless of the plaintiff’s race. In the absence of more cases 
with plaintiffs of other races before minority judges, we can only offer very tentative patterns to study 
further in the future. 
 173. See, e.g., Juliano & Schwab, supra note 98, at 594 (indicating the plaintiffs’ success rate as 
48.2% in sexual harassment cases, considering 51.2% rate in district courts and 39% in appellate 
courts).  
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identification with or inclination to be protective of women in their lives, 
such as wives and daughters. In contrast, White judges in a racial 
harassment lawsuit may not identify with, or have any reason to be 
protective of, minority plaintiffs. They rarely, perhaps because of a general 
lack of close interpersonal relationships with African Americans, have a 
personal basis for connecting with or being sympathetic toward a minority 
plaintiff who claims racial harassment. 
B. Judges’ Race and Judges’ Political Affiliation 
Judges’ political affiliation also plays a role in their decision making. A 
significant difference marks case outcomes for judges appointed by 
Democratic Presidents and judges appointed by Republican Presidents: 
Democratic judges are more likely to find for plaintiffs (29.3%) than their 
Republican peers (17%). Considering together the judges’ race and the 
judges’ political affiliations offers some interesting insights. Plaintiffs 
experience the highest win rate before African American Democratic 
judges (47%), but are followed closely by plaintiffs before African 
American Republican judges (43%). A greater contrast exists between the 
rulings of White Democratic (27%) and White Republican judges (17%). 
However, the judges’ race remains a stronger influence than the 
judges’ political affiliation, as suggested by the 20% difference in 
plaintiffs’ win rate between White Democratic judges and African 
American Democratic judges. Logistic regression analyses also confirm 
that both the judges’ political affiliation and the judges’ race are 
independently significant to case outcomes, and that the judge’s race has 
more of an effect. For instance, the modeling indicates that while having a 
Republican judge decreases the plaintiff’s chance of winning by an 
average of 0.5, appearing before an African American judge increases the 
plaintiff’s chance of winning by about three times. 
What explains these results? Judges’ political ideologies may well 
affect their assessment of racial harassment cases given that racial 
discrimination is a subject on which citizens hold divergent political 
views. Research suggests those who identify as conservatives are less 
supportive of policies and laws that protect minorities.174 For African 
American Republicans, however, their race seems more salient than their 
 
 
 174. See Maria Krysan, Prejudice, Politics, and Public Opinion: Understanding the Sources of 
Racial Policy Attitudes, 26 ANNU. REV. SOC. 135, 146 (2000) (summarizing research indicating that 
“people who prefer a limited government or identify their ideology as conservative tend to oppose 
equal treatment policies, government spending on blacks, and preferences in hiring and promotion.”). 
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political ideology, at least in the type of cases we have been considering. 
Perhaps African Americans, regardless of their political affiliation, can 
identify with being targets of racial harassment. After all, racial harassers 
presumably do not distinguish African American employees who are 
Democrats from those who are Republicans. 
Our findings also help us better understand why the justice system in 
general seems so inhospitable to plaintiffs’ racial harassment claims. In 
our study of judges, Republicans outnumbered Democrats and Whites 
substantially outnumbered African Americans, with about 60% of the 
cases heard by Republican judges and about 80% of the cases heard by 
White judges. Given the propensity for Republicans and for Whites to 
deny plaintiffs’ claims, it is not surprising that plaintiffs as a group are 
successful in only one out of five cases. 
C. Judges’ Race and Merits of the Case 
Our study also considered plaintiffs’ specific allegations, in particular 
that harassers used racial slurs or that both supervisors and coworkers 
participated in harassing them. As in earlier research, our data indicated 
that judges as a group pay considerable attention to both claims, 
presumably because they are viewed as factual evidence that the 
harassment was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” and “because of race”—
both key elements in the plaintiff’s case. As compared to the baseline 
plaintiffs’ success rate of 22%, when plaintiffs claim racial slurs, they win 
30% of the time. When they claim harassment by both supervisors and 
coworkers, they win 37% of the time. Logistic regression analyses further 
indicated that these claims were independently significant from both 
judges’ race and judges’ political party. Furthermore, they had a 
substantial effect on case outcomes, with claims of racial slurs improving 
the plaintiffs’ odds by a factor of three. Meanwhile, claims of harassment 
by both supervisors and coworkers increased the plaintiffs’ odds for 
success by 2.8. A closer look at how judges of different races factored in 
these claims revealed some important patterns. Both African American 
and White judges paid comparable attention to racial slurs, being about 
one-third more likely to hold for the plaintiffs. 
What occurs when plaintiffs make these claims? It appears that judges 
of all races have a heightened sensitivity to racial slurs. While White 
judges may not be attentive to more subtle forms of racism, racial slurs are 
by definition evidence of race-based harassment and are illustrative of 
severe and socially unacceptable abuse. While Hispanic judges may not 
generally identify with African American plaintiffs, they apparently 
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recognize the significance of racial slurs. Not surprisingly, African 
American judges also appreciated the clear derogatory intent of racial 
slurs.  
It is also interesting to explore the judges’ reaction to plaintiffs’ claim 
of harassment by both supervisors and coworkers. White judges gave this 
claim the greatest weight, with the plaintiffs’ success rate significantly 
improving by more than 80%. This claim did not seem to make much 
difference to African American judges, with plaintiffs’ success rate with 
this claim being about the same as the rate before African American 
judges in general. Too few cases with this claim came before Hispanic 
judges to make a meaningful observation.  
Perhaps White judges perceive harassment by both supervisors and 
coworkers as strong evidence of pervasive harassment and see this kind of 
“ganging up” on an employee as contrary to fair play. Furthermore, if a 
harasser acted alone, it may be easier to explain the harassment as 
interpersonal conflict or one person’s crude attempt at humor, rather than 
as conduct motivated by racial animus. For African American judges, 
given their own experiences with broad-based societal discrimination, all 
these distinctions may not be particularly salient. Perhaps they perceive 
racial harassment as likely to be perpetrated by one person or a group and 
that supervisors are as likely as others to engage in it.  
These results then suggest that judges pay attention to the factual 
merits of each case. Bear in mind, however, that even with these claims, 
judges do not automatically hold for the plaintiff. For instance, while 
plaintiffs’ odds for success improve when they claim racial slurs, they still 
lose 40% of the time with African American judges and more than 70% of 
the time with White judges. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Every year, thousands of employees, most of them African Americans, 
accuse their supervisors or coworkers of racial harassment. Many disputes 
find their way to the federal courts, where judges, most often White, have 
to decide whether these claims are credible or not. A formalist model of 
judicial decision making posits that it does not matter whether the judge is 
White or some other race because judges are required to decide cases on 
the merits of the case and that this process is objective. A realist model of 
judicial decision making proposes instead that judges’ race does make a 
difference since judges, like everyone else, are products of their own 
societal experiences and social forces.  
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Our empirical study provides some comfort and consternation for both 
judicial models. Our multiple statistical analyses clearly indicate that 
judges of different races do exhibit significantly different decision-making 
patterns.175 White judges are more likely than their African American 
counterparts to favor employer defendants, often granting their motions 
for summary judgment. African American judges are more likely to 
believe that employees have credible grievances of racial harassment. At 
the same time, it appears that both African American and White judges 
recognize relevant factual features of the case, such as whether the 
harassment included racial slurs or harassment by both coworkers and 
supervisors. Thus, neither group is inattentive to the legal principles; 
rather they differ in their interpretation and understanding of the dispute.  
Our findings may disturb individuals across the political spectrum. 
Some may view it as evidence that African American judges are biased 
and pro-plaintiff in racial harassment cases, while White judges protect 
traditional judicial norms. Others may conclude that White judges are 
predisposed against racial harassment cases, discriminate against African 
American plaintiffs, and favor employer-defendants and accused 
harassers.  
However, one message is clear from the data: race matters in judicial 
decision making. It affects outcomes even when we take into account the 
judge’s political affiliation or case characteristics. While we might have 
intuitively expected the judge’s race to make a difference, this study 
provides empirical proof.  
The remaining question is why race matters. Our interpretation is that 
race affects a judge’s ability to appreciate the perspective of a plaintiff of 
another race. Thus, White judges as a group are less able to identify and 
empathize with African American plaintiffs, making it inherently more 
difficult to find the plaintiffs’ arguments plausible and credible. This 
interpretation helps explain why White judges deny African American 
plaintiffs’ claims so often. In contrast, it appears that African American 
judges are more capable of transcending their own demography and do not 
let color influence their decision making. They can identify with African 
American plaintiffs, but also with plaintiffs of other races. At the same 
time, African American judges still discern between more or less credible 
claims, holding for plaintiffs only about half of the time.  
 
 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 128–63. As explained in text accompanying notes 164–
65, when all variables were simultaneously considered, the role that judges’ race plays loses some 
statistical significance (as one might expect with the larger number of variables).  
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Racial harassment cases often involve motions for summary judgment 
where judges are asked to study the facts to determine if the harassment 
was “because of race” rather than for a race-neutral reason and if the 
harassment was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to result in a hostile and 
intimidating work environment. African American judges’ experiences 
give them valuable knowledge, perspectives, and understandings of 
minority plaintiffs that many Whites lack (while White judges provide 
insights on the harassment of White employees). Since African American 
judges have likely experienced discrimination themselves, they can 
recognize more complex and subtle forms of racial harassment. Given that 
subtle and nuanced forms of discrimination are more prevalent today than 
blatant forms, the greater sensitivity of African American judges aids other 
judges in interpreting ambiguous interactions between plaintiffs and their 
alleged harassers. The multiple subjectivities of a racially diverse judiciary 
thus help unveil the complex reality and accurate “objectivity” of racial 
dynamics in the workplace.  
Since our study found that the racial make-up of the judiciary affects 
outcomes, a more diverse judiciary will bring more diverse views on what 
constitutes racial harassment—ideally reflecting the range of views across 
all racial groups in society.176 With 80% of all federal judges (and 89% of 
all state judges) being White and our findings that White judges rule less 
favorably for racial harassment plaintiffs (who are typically African 
American), it is not surprising that some minorities place little faith in the 
judicial system.177 If people of all races are to believe in judicial fairness, a 
more diverse bench is a good place to start. Plaintiffs are less likely to feel 
marginalized when their experiences are viewed seriously. They are thus 
more likely to conclude the legal system is not biased. Legal principles 
prevail but are interpreted with the benefit of varied perspectives that are 
integral to the just resolution of racial harassment cases. Our study 
reinforces the need for the judiciary to be representative of the public it 
serves. Judges do not make decisions in racial harassment cases in a color-
 
 
 176. Likewise, given our findings regarding judges’ political affiliation, it is not surprising that the 
judicial appointment process has become so politicized. Republicans want to appoint new judges that 
are “Republican” in their judicial orientation and Democrats want to appoint judges that are 
“Democratic” in their orientation.  
 177. See CHAMBLISS, supra note 6, at 57 (describing studies that indicate minorities are more 
likely than other groups to believe that unequal treatment in the courts occurs frequently and that court 
outcomes are “seldom or never fair”).  
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blind legal system. As a legal community and as a diverse society, we 
should not be blind to the color of judges.178 
 
 
 178. Additional information on research methodology is available from the authors and in Chew 
& Kelley, supra note 97. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1164 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:1117 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A: DATA SET SUMMARY 
Number of Cases 
Judges’ Race 
 White 351 
 African American 24 
 Hispanic 21 
 Asian American 3 
 All minority 48 
 Unknown 29 
Judges’ Gender 
 Female 78 
 Male 349 
 Unknown 1 
Mixed Race Judicial Panels 39 
Mixed Gender Judicial Panels 60 
Judicial Circuit  
 First 9 
 Second 80 
 Fifth 68 
 Seventh 154 
 Ninth 65 
 Eleventh 52
   
Magistrate Judges 64 
Foreign-born Judges 20 
Judges’ Birth  
 Pre-1946 295 
 1946–1964 127 
 Post-1965 1 
 Unknown 5 
Judges’ Political Affiliation 
 1st Appointment by Democratic President 169 
 1st Appointment by Republican President 231 
 Unknown 28 
President Appointing Judges 
 Reagan 128 
 Clinton 89 
 Carter 54 
 Bush (H.) 52 
 Nixon 32 
 All Other Presidents 45 
 Unknown 28 
Judges with LLM Degree 32 
Judges with Clerkship 143 
Judges with Gov. Experience 289 
Judges with Teaching Experience 128 
Judges with Law Firm Experience 370 
Judges with Military Service 183 
Plaintiffs Successful 94 
Defendants Successful 353 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss5/2
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APPENDIX B: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS FOR MAIN EFFECTS 
Variable OR* LCL** UCL** x2 df p
Judges’ Race 7.7 2 .02
African American Judge vs. White Judge 3.27 1.41 7.60 7.6 1 .006
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge 0.91 0.30 2.78 <0.1 1 .87
R2 = .03 
 *Odds ratio 
**95% Confidence interval for OR 
 
 OR* LCL** UCL** x2 df p 
Judges’ Race 5.4 2 .07
African American Judge vs. White Judge 2.72 1.15 6.43 5.2 1 .02
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge 0.85 0.28 2.64 .08 1 .78
Republican Judge vs. Democratic Judge 0.53 0.33 0.87 6.3 1 .01
R2 = .05 
 *Odds ratio 
**95% Confidence interval for OR 
 
 OR* LCL** UCL** x2 df p 
Judges’ Race 7.1 2 .03
African American Judge vs. White Judge 3.28 1.36 7.89 7.0 1 .008
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge 1.00 0.32 3.15 <0.1 1 .99
Racial Slurs 3.35 1.93 5.82 18.4 1 <.001
R2 = .11 
 *Odds ratio 
**95% Confidence interval for OR 
 
 OR* LCL** UCL** x2 df p 
Judges’ Race 4.3 2 .12
African American Judge vs. White Judge 2.54 1.05 6.13 4.3 1 .04
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge 1.07 0.34 3.37 <0.1 1 .90
Harassers Both Supervisors & Coworkers 3.08 1.86 5.13 18.9 1 <.001
R2 = .10 
 *Odds ratio 
**95% Confidence interval for OR 
ALL VARIABLES 
 OR* LCL** UCL** x2 df p 
Judges’ Race 2.7 2 .25
African American Judge vs. White Judge 2.16 0.87 5.36 2.7 1 .10
Hispanic Judge vs. White Judge 1.06 0.33 3.45 <0.1 1 .92
Republican Judge vs. Democratic Judge 0.45 0.27 0.76 8.9 1 .003
Racial Slurs 2.69 1.49 4.85 10.8 1 .001
Harassers Both Supervisors & Coworkers 2.50 1.44 4.33 10.7 1 .001
R2 = .17 
 *Odds ratio 
**95% Confidence interval for OR 
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APPENDIX C: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS FOR TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS† 
Interaction term χ2 df p 
  
Judge’s race * Judge’s political party 0.2 2 .89
Judge’s race * Racial slurs 1.2 2 .55
Judge’s race * Both supervisor and coworker 
harassment 1.5 2 .47
Judge’s political party * Racial slurs 1.9 1 .17
Judge’s political party * Both supervisor and 
coworker harassment 0.2 1 .65
Racial slurs * Both supervisor and coworker 
harassment 3.2 1 .08
† Each test represents the effect of the interaction term specified in a logistic regression 
model that also includes the main effects of a judge’s race, a judge’s political party, racial 
slurs, and both supervisor and coworker harassment. 
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